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I. INTRODUCTION
Credit insurance has become a significant part of credit transactions in
this country and represents an important method of reducing risk in debtor-
creditor relationships. Attention has been directed toward the practice of
conditioning the sale of credit to purchasing credit insurance.1 Proponents
of the practice claim that credit insurance benefits both the creditor and
debtor and, in the absence of patent overreaching by the creditor, facilitates
the credit transaction. Critics contend that the insurance tie-ins are used to
avoid state usury laws and are largely coercive devices imposed solely to
protect creditors."
The insurance industry, like much of the banking credit industry, exists
in a regulated environment. State insurance commissions supervise premium
rates for credit insurance and state and federal banking agencies monitor
credit practices. Notwithstanding the regulatory control, credit insurance
tie-ins and other coercive practices are allegedly prevalent abuses of con-
sumer perogatives in markets for credit and may stem from institutional
failures and inadequate standard setting and enforcement by regulators.
More recently, the controversy over coercive creditor practices has
shifted to a legislative forum, focusing less on protection of consumers and
more on competition between the insurance industry and the banking and
lending industries.' This shift in attention has also caused renewed interest
in examining the nature and quality of credit institutions and credit insur-
ance regulation.
Legislative attention to the subject of tie-ins of credit insurance, along
with some judicial decisions, 4 has raised pertinent questions for considera-
1. See Baker, 39 AmTrmuST L.J. 433-45 (1970); E.J. Faulkner, An Underwriter Looks at
Insurance in Connection with Lending, in CREDrr LIE ,A DisABuXrf INsuRANCE 11 (minutes
of the Conference on Personal Fin. Law) (ABA New York 1952-53) [hereinafter cited as
Faulkner].
2. Compare Faulkner, supra note 1, at 10 with Mors, Consumer Installment Credit In-
surance, 1956 INS. L.J. 299 [hereinafter cited as Mora].
3. See generally Tie-ins of the Sale of Insurance by Banks and Bank Holding Compa-
nies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings].
Historically, the Congress has taken a fairly active interest in alleged abuses in creditor-
debtor relationships and the insurance industry, especially tying arrangements. See, e.g., One
Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S.1052 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking & Currency. 91st Cong., 2d Sees. (1970); Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970: Hearings on H.R.6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., lst
Sees. (1969); Consumer Credit Insurance Act of 1969: Hearings on S.1754 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Seass. (1969).
4. See, e.g., Indep. Ins. Agent v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981); King v.
[Vol. 32
HeinOnline  -- 32 Drake L. Rev. 862 1982-1983
Antitrust and Credit Insurance
tion. A threshold question concerns the existence and degree of coercive ty-
ing arrangements in credit insurance markets. Recent reports and studies
have vigorously debated the significance of credit insurance tying arrange-
ments in terms of their impact on consumers and competitive conditions in
affected markets and their pervasiveness. A second question concerns the
effectiveness of state and federal regulatory schemes in recognizing and
prohibiting coercive credit practices. Effective regulation on the state and
federal levels may preclude the need for antitrust remedies.
A third issue concerns the relationship of antitrust law and policy to
credit insurance tying arrangements. Markets for credit are quite varied in
their complexity and the range of anticompetitive conduct is very broad.
These facts require consideration of a policy of applying antitrust rules to
joint sales of credit and credit insurance. Of equal concern, from an anti-
trust perspective, is the recent pronouncements of the United States Su-
preme Court, in the Fortner5 litigation, on the subject of tying arrangements
in credit transactions.
This article discusses these issues in the following manner. First, there
will be a discussion of the credit and credit insurance markets and a descrip-
tion of the legislative controversy. Central to that controversy, and critical
to an understanding of the antitrust issues, are certain studies on the credit
tying issue, which will be discussed in detail. Then, consideration will be
given to tying analysis under the antitrust laws with special emphasis on the
Fortner litigation. Finally, the article will consider the question of immunity
or exemption from the federal antitrust laws for credit insurance tie-in ar-
rangements because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the state action
doctrine.
II. THE CREDIT INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
A. The Market for Credit Insurance
There are essentially three forms of credit insurance commonly used in
the United States: health and accident insurance for credit purposes; credit
life insurance; and individual life insurance which is used for credit pur-
poses.' The first two forms of credit insurance are the most important for
purposes of this article, and together the credit life, health and accident in-
surance industries comprise a multi-billion dollar business. 7 In its essential
Credithrift of Am., Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61722 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
5. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 61 (1977); Fortner En-
terprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
6. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 9; See also CONSUMER CREDr LivE AND DIsABEnrrl INSUR-
ANCE 16-18 (Study by College of Business Admin., Ohio Univ.) (C. Hubbard ed. 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ohio Study].
7. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 542-57 (statement of Golembe Associates); Ohio Study,
supra note 6, at 8-10; Faulkner, supra note 1, at 9.
One source estimated that there was more than $100 billion of credit life insurance in force
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characteristics, credit insurance is a contract of insurance either on the life
of a debtor or to provide indemnity for payments becoming due after the
debtor becomes disabled or dies.8 Because of the financial attractiveness of
the sale of credit insurance and because of its obvious relationship to loan
and other credit transactions, a great number of institutions routinely offer
credit insurance in connection with loans, including banks, finance compa-
nies, credit unions, retailers, and the various types of insurance companies.
While the benefits associated with the provision of credit insurance are
many and they seem to fall on different classes of debtors equally, it is not
altogether clear that the burdens of credit insurance tie-ins fall on all classes
equally. An insurance policy benefits debtors by paying off their loans when
they die or become disabled and it strengthens borrowers' credit attractive-
ness by providing a hedge against loss of employment income due to disabil-
ity, the principal source of loan retirement.9 Credit insurance also provides
substantial benefits to the lender by reducing the costs of replevin and re-
possession actions, strengthening the collaterability of the security, ex-
panding the market for the extension of credit to persons otherwise unable
to obtain credit and enhancing the goodwill and public relations of the
lender.10 The attractiveness of credit insurance to lenders, however, may en-
courage implicit or explicit pressure by credit officers to condition the sale of
credit on the joint purchase of credit insurance, especially where the pro-
spective debtor is poor or otherwise a bad credit risk or where a credit of-
ficer is compensated by receipt of a commission on credit insurance sales.
Given the profitability of sales of credit insurance-approximately 180
million dollars in premiums being written by approximately 400 compa-
nies 1 -it is not surprising that the structure of the credit insurance indus-
try has changed over the years.12 Banks, bank holding companies, mortgage
companies, finance companies, auto dealers and credit unions are today of-
fering credit insurance with the extension of loans and in other credit trans-
in the United States today, with annual premiums of more than a billion dollars. 1979 Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 284 (Statement of National Consumer Law Center). These figures appear
consistent with other measurements of credit life insurance sales. See, e.g., 1979 Hearings,
supra note 3, at 97 (Statement of Lewis N. Goldfarb).
8. A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE REGULATION OF CREDIT LIFE AND DIsABILITY INSURANCE
2-5 (Study by National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs) (1970) [hereinafter cited as NAIC Study]; Mors,
supra note 2, at 299-301.
Credit insurance may be sold either on an individual policy or under a group policy, and
the latter coniprises the overwhelming portion of policies. Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 15.
While in major respects, the two types of policies are similar, there are significant differences.
On an individual policy, the creditor is an agent of the insurance company and the debtor is the
policyholder. On a group policy, the creditor is the policyholder and not an agent of the insurer,
even though the creditor often makes the sale. Id.
9. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 10; NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 5-6.
10. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 10-11; NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 5.
11. Burfeind, The Outlook for Credit Ins., 3 J. RErAIL BANKING 63 (1981).
12. Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 8-14.
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actions either directly or through subsidiary credit insurance companies.
However, notwithstanding the growth in types of credit insurance provided,
the credit insurance industry has been experiencing a high rate of concen-
tration and, compared to other industries; is not a particularly competitive
industry."8 These trends in market structure strongly suggest that the credit
insurance industry may be suffering from poor industry performance and
may explain, in part, coercive or anticompetitive behavior in the market.
There are essentially three types of problems limiting good performance
in the credit insurance industry, and they each have some significance with
respect to the antitrust implications of the credit insurance industry. The
first is the poor market structure. The industry is becoming increasingly
concentrated with fewer firms underwriting risks and with an increase in
mergers and acquisitions of banks and savings and loan associations.14 Fur-
thermore, with increasing frequency, lending institutions are acquiring or
forming credit insurance providers as captive insurers to reinsure credit in-
surance placed with other insurers or to write policies.16
Captive insurance subsidiaries may create pressures within a holding
company or corporate complex to sell credit insurance and to require that
debtors purchase credit insurance only from the affiliated firm. The second
problem concerns marketing conduct in the industry. Credit insurance is
purchased solely in connection with the sale and purchase of credit and it
therefore tends to be a "one-shot" or one-time purchase by the debtor.
From a marketing perspective, this tends to reinforce the sales oriented na-
ture of the insurance relationship between the lender and debtor to enhance
the likelihood of coercive practices in the short term relationship." Because
13. 1979 Hearings, aupra note 3, at 2-3 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller of the
Currency); see also Marcus, The Undermining of an Antitrust Bank Merger Policy, 16 DEPAuL
L. REv. 59, 59-61 (1966).
Indeed, even the insurance industry, which has generally been considered competitive, has
been showing a marked trend toward higher levels of concentration in its principal lines of
insurance. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 560-63 (Statement of Golembe Associates). Thus,
although some of the growth in concentration in the credit insurance industry may be attrib-
uted to the more general increased concentration in the insurance industry, there appears to be
conditions unique to credit insurance which explains the greater concentration growths in that
industry.
14. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2-3 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller);
Burfeind, supra note 11, at 65.
15. Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 27; Burfeind, supra note 11, at 65-66.
Captive insurance companies may provide the lending institution with various internal effi-
ciencies. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 588-99 (Statement of Golembe Associates). How-
ever, captive insurers may often be used to channel additional profits to the parent lender and
to avoid state regulatory limits on compensation to the creditor for the sale of credit insurance.
Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 27; NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 14-15. The availability of these
benefits from captive insurance companies enhances the possibility of tie-ins and other coercive
behavior; for example, by increasing the number of credit transactions accompanied by the
joint sale of credit insurance.
16. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 2-3 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller of the
1982-83]
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of this inherent characteristic of the product, various conduct abuses have
been reported in the industry. These include tying or coercive joint sales of
credit and credit insurance,1 7 inadequate truth-in-lending disclosure of the
effective cost of insurance, self-dealing by lending institution officers in the
receipt of credit insurance commissions, aggressive sales techniques by lend-
ing institution officers due to bonuses offered for high volume of credit in-
surance sales, and relatively high premiums because of "reverse
competition.""
Currency).
This presents a point of some debate and it is not insignificant. The banking industry has
claimed that coercive practices by banks on its customers are irrational because customers will
seek banking services elsewhere, and that banks attempt to develop stable, long-term relation-
ships with customers. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 176-177 (Statement of Lawrence F. No-
ble), and at 188-195 (Report of Golembe Associates). However, this assertion is conditional on
several other factors; including the availability of other sources of credit to the customer, the
customer's knowledge that the coercive practice has occurred, the customer's reluctance to in-
cur the costs of searching for another lender, and the actual or prospective longevity of the
credit relationship between the institution and the individual, which may be more closely re-
lated to customers' attitudes than to bank practices.
Additionally, it should be noted that this assertion by the banking industry does not apply
to other lenders, such as finance companies and retail establishments like auto dealerships that
do not provide noncredit banking services and which most frequently provide credit on a one-
time basis.
17. See NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 59-60; Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 42.
A joint sale of credit and credit insurance may be beneficial to the purchaser or it may be a
tie-in arrangement. The credit or loan is the more highly prized "tying product" and the credit
insurance is the "tied product". As discussed in this article, the degree to which a joint sale will
be considered a tying arrangement, and therefore subject to the antitrust laws, depends upon
the degree of vendor's coercion in the transaction and the vendor's market power in the market
for the tying product.
One other relevant consideration concerns the source or vendor of credit insurance. Where
a lender requires the debtor to obtain credit insurance but does not sell such insurance, there is
no antitrust issue with respect to tie-ins although there may be consumer protection problems
related to adequate disclosure. Rather, there are antitrust implications only where tying ar-
rangements are imposed by related or integrated firms which provide both credit and credit
insurance and attempt to condition the sale of their credit on the purchase of their credit
insurance.
18. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3-5 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller of
the Currency); Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 40-45; NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 13-23, 39-52.
There is an obvious and close relationship between the problems of industry structure and
the problems of industry conduct, and the closeness of that relationship stems, in large part,
from the use of captive insurance subsidiaries of credit institutions providing credit insurance
on the loans and credit transactions of the parent or affiliated company. Thus, for example, a
course of joint sales or tie-ins and inadequate truth-in-lending disclosures may indicate at-
tempts by the lender to use the related credit insurance as a method of avoiding state usury
laws. Similarly, problems of self-dealing and aggressive marketing techniques may often arise
from pressures and incentives placed on the lending institution officers by the profitable credit
insurance subsidiaries. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 577-87 (Statement of Golembe As-
sociates). It may also result from opportunistic behavior by the lender who perceives that the
debtor has a circumscribed range of choice among sources of credit, an inability to understand
[Vol. 32
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The third problem, and the subject of the next section, concerns the
degree and nature of regulation by state and federal governmental agencies.
At present there is a patchwork of state and federal regulation affecting
credit insurance industry structure and conduct. While it is very difficult to
draw any conclusions concerning the effectiveness of and, in some instances,
the reasons for, the regulation, the extent of regulatory oversight has signifi-
cance in considering the application of antitrust rules.
B. Industry Regulation
Both the federal government and the various state governments regu-
late, directly and indirectly, the credit insurance industry. However, both
the nature of governmental control and the extent of the control vary to
such a degree that it is difficult to predict with confidence the resolution of a
tie-in arrangement controversy. The federal government, through the Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve System, regulates the sale
and marketing of credit insurance by banks and bank holding companies
and intracorporate relationships between banks and affiliated insurance
companies. 1' Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission may, in the exer-
cise of its consumer protection duties, oversee lender adherence to the dic-
tates of the Truth-in-Lending Act which requires, among other things, ade-
quate disclosure of charges for credit life premiums in credit transactions. 0
the context and content of transaction documents, or an inability to subsequently renegotiate
the terms of the loan. See generally Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts,
65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
"Reverse competition" is a problem which stems from unique market characteristics. In a
credit insurance situation, there are three parties: the creditor; an insurance provider from
whom the creditor purchases credit insurance; and the debtor. In this circumstance, the credi-
tor is not necessarily interested in obtaining inexpensive or economical insurance because the
creditor, in acting as an insurance agent, makes additional profit on the credit transaction by
providing the credit insurance which pays the highest commission to the selling agent, even if
(as is usually the case) it is the most expensive insurance. Rubin, Credit Life Insurance and
Its Alternatives, 12 J. CONsuMER AAsss 145 (1978). Therefore, creditors have incentives to
bid up the cost of insurance, especially where the creditor is an owner or an affiliate of the
insurance company providing the credit insurance. See NAIC Study, supra note 8, at 21-22.
19. See Schweitzer and Halbrook, Insurance Activities of Banks and Bank Holding Com-
panies: A Survey of Current Issues and Regulations, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 743, 745-46 (1980)
[Hereinafter cited as Schweitzer and Halbrook].
The tension between federal regulatory statutory schemes, which have tended to restrict
the scope of banking practices, and federal regulatory authorities, which have encouraged ex-
pansion by banks into traditionally nonbanking areas, is depicted in Investment Company In-
stitute v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C.Cir.1979). The case in-
volved the ability of bank holding companies to engage in investment advice activities, as
approved by the Federal Reserve Board, but contested by an association of mutual funds po-
tential competitors in the market for investment advice. Id. The context of the case illustrates
the significant conflict between Congress and regulatory agency officials, and between actual
and potential competitors in markets for financial and insurance goods and services.
20. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(f), 226.19(a)(19).
1982-831
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The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 were the prod-
uct of an intense confrontation between the banking industry and the inde-
pendent insurance agents." The amendments prohibit the extension of
credit on the condition that the customer obtain some additional services
from the bank, prohibit banks and bank holding companies from acquiring
control of nonbanking institutions, and prohibit banks and bank holding
companies from engaging in nonbanking activities except where the activity
is "closely related to banking" and where the activity performed by the
bank will be beneficial to the public." The 1970 Amendments did not, how-
ever, completely preclude banks and bank holding companies from engaging
in insurance activities, including the provision of credit insurance. In fact,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System specifically provided
that credit insurance may be a proper incident of and closely related to
banking activity.' s
One provision of the 1970 Amendments specifically prohibits explicit
tie-ins and permits the use of evidence concerning prior coercive tie-in prac-
tices by a bank or affiliated firm in a proceeding to merge with, acquire, or
initiate an insurance affiliate." Notwithstanding considerable pressure by
21. Schweitzer and Halbrook, supra note 19, at 744; See generally, One-Bank Holding
Company Legislation of 1970: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
22. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 3-4 (statement of John Heimann); Schweitzer and
Halbrook, supra note 19, at 744-745.
The pertinent statutory provision is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8)(19), which grants the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the power to permit a bank holding com-
pany to acquire shares of any other company when the "performance by an affiliate of a holding
company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater conve-
nience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse affects, such
as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or
unsound banking practices." This provision, and the regulations promulgated by the Federal
Reserve System to implement the 1970 amendments, generated a great deal of litigation on the
issues of closely related activities and beneficial public impact. See, e.g., Indep. Ins. Agents of
Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981); Ass'n of
Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 568 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.
1978); Bank Americard Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 491 F.2d 985 (9th
Cir. 1974).
In 1971, the Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation Y, by which it attempted to aug-
ment the basic policy of the 1970 Amendments limiting regulated banks and bank holding com-
panies in their nonbanking activities, such as insurance underwriting and sales. See 12 C.F.R. §
225.4(a)(9)-(a)(10) (1981). Regulation Y, as initially written, was ultimately upheld, but not
without controversy. See Ala. Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978);
See generally Schweitzer and Halbrook, supra note 19, at 747.
23. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9) (1981); See also Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981).
24. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972 (1980). In pertinent part, the statute provides:
(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of any
kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing,
[Vol. 32
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the insurance industry, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System have remained adamant that
product extension mergers into the insurance industry and initiation of in-
surance business by banks and bank holding companies may be beneficial
for both the banking industry and the public.' In 1978, the Federal Reserve
on the condition or requirement-
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, prop-
erty, or service from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit,
or trust service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, prop-
erty, or service from a bank holding company of such bank, or from
any other subsidiary of such bank holding company-,
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property,
or service to such bank, other than those related to and usually pro-
vided in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property,
or service to a bank holding company of such bank, or to any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, prop-
erty, or service from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding com-
pany of such bank, or any subsidiary of such bank holding company,
other than a condition or requirement that such bank shall reasona-
bly impose in a credit transaction to assure the soundness of the
credit.
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing
prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of this chapter.
The purpose of the provision is "to eliminate anticompetitive practices which require bank
customers to accept or provide some other service or product or refrain from dealing with other
parties in order to obtain the bank product or service they desire." S.Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 45 (1969) (statement of Senator Brook).
The statutory provision prohibiting, inter alia, tying arrangements by regulated banks and
bank holding companies, has been augmented by regulations and construed by the courts. See,
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(c) (1980); see also Indep. Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981). In that case, the Independent Insurance Agents, in resisting
an effort of a bank to initiate a subsidiary to sell insurance, argued that it would lead to "coer-
cive or voluntary tying practices" and that "credit customers would believe, based on either
overt or subtle actions by... [the applicant] that they would be more likely to receive loans if
they purchased insurance through" the subsidiary. Id. at 575. The court, reversing the action of
the Federal Reserve Board refusing a hearing on the agent's contentions, outlined the detailed
factual inquiries encumbent upon the Board in a proceeding under 12 U.S.C. section 1843 to
permit a bank's performance of nonbanking activities. Id. at 576. The court stated that a fac-
tual inquiry into the potential for coercive and voluntary tying was necessitated by the agents'
request and the federal regulations. Id.
25. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller of the
Currency).
Comptroller of the Currency, John Heimann, concluded in his statement that the benefits
to banks and bank holding companies of selling property and casualty insurance were signifi-
cant enough to recommend their future use. Id. at 10. He claimed that the benefits attendant
the ability of banks and bank holding companies to sell credit insurance include "one stop"
shopping, whereby consumers can obtain both credit and credit insurance at one institution,
combined billing for both services and, perhaps more important, enhanced competition in the
1982-83]
HeinOnline  -- 32 Drake L. Rev. 869 1982-1983
Drake Law Review
Board conducted a research study on the use of tie-in arrangements by
banks and bank holding companies."6 The study, which concluded that ex-
plicit tie-in arrangements were "practically nonexistent" and that implicit
pressures to purchase credit insurance were not particularly strong,"T
prompted such a substantial amount of criticism that a congressional hear-
ing was held on the study in 1979. The study and the 1979 hearing are dis-
cussed in the following section.
State insurance commissions and agencies are also charged with a duty
to control some aspects of the credit insurance market. State regulation,
unlike federal regulation by the Federal Reserve Board of banks and bank
holding companies, tends to control the level of allowable premium charges
for most forms of credit insurance and, to varying degrees, imposes stan-
dards of fair dealing between the insurance provider and the customer.ss For
example, most states have regulatory legislation governing credit insurance
based upon three model bills provided by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners. Typically these bills delineate responsibilities for dis-
closure and rate filings, submission of forms of contract and issuance of poli-
cies, refunds, judicial review and the like. Further, these bills commonly
provide that where a creditor requires credit insurance the debtor may sat-
isfy the requirement through existing insurance coverage or through any
other insurer that is authorized to provide the coverage in that state. 9
Although the model bills tend to address problems in the relationship
between the creditor and debtor other than explicit tie-in arrangements,"0
market for insurance and an alternative source of access to credit insurance for consumers. Id.
These beneficial aspects were underscored by the remarks of J. Charles Partee, Governor of
the Federal Reserve Board, who also claimed that it was not uncommon for bank holding com-
panies that were making applications for extension into the area of credit insurance, to agree to
hold their premiums below the ceilings established by state regulatory commissions. 1979 Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of J. Charles Partee); See also 1979 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 588-99 (Statement of Golembe Associates).
26. See 1979 Hearings supra note 3, at 15-92 [hereinafter cited as FRS Study].
27. FRS Study, supra note 26, at 17.
28. See generally Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 36-51; NAIC Study supra note 8, at 67-68;
Hanson, The Interplay of the Regimes of Antitrust, Competition and State Insurance Regula-
tion on the Business of Insurance, 28 DRAE L. REv. 767 (1978-79).
29. See NAIC Study supra note 8, at 52-93; see generally Ohio Study supra note 6, at 38-
45.
30. J. Seymour, Trend Towards Insurance Provisions and Small Loan Statutes, in
Cmrr Luz A n DmisAmrry INSURANCE, supra note 1, at 16-28.
The early legislation seems to have the following general aims: (1) o provide that the
amount of insurance should not exceed the value of the property that is insured; (2) to require
that only firms licensed to do business in the state should be permitted to underwrite credit
insurance and that they should do so only at administratively established rate levels; and (3) to
prevent credit firms from receiving commissions on credit insurance.
The various model regulations prepared by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, and adopted by many states, commonly permit a choice of insurer by the debtor where
the creditor requires credit insurances as additional security on the loan. See, e.g., ARiz. REv.
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some other states have taken a more direct approach to the problem. Some
jurisdictions, for example, expressly prohibit explicit tie-ins between the sale
of credit and the sale of credit insurance."' In a few circumstances, state
insurance regulatory commissions or agencies will actively enforce these ex-
press prohibitions on tying arrangements or, perhaps more commonly, will
rely on consumer complaints to prompt performance of their regulatory re-
sponsibilities. In most states, however, there are no express prohibitions on
coercive tying of credit insurance to sales of credit under state law and very
little supervision of consumer sales practices by state regulatory agencies.
III. THE 1979 HEARNGS
In 1979, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
under the leadership of Senator William Proxmire, held hearings on the
Federal Reserve System study, and the debate on the issues of the existence
and degree of tie-in arrangements in the banking industry was vigorous. Be-
cause the issues raised and debated in the hearings bear closely on issues of
tie-in arrangements in nonbank markets, which is largely the subject of this
article, a careful consideration of the hearings is necessary.8'
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1601 to 20-1616 (1982); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 779.1-.26 (West 1982).
31. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 507B.5 (1981); LA. INs. CODE, R.S. 22:1214(9) (West 1978).
For example, the Iowa statute provides in relevant part that:
1. No person may do any of the following: (a) Require, as a condition precedent to the
lending of money or credit, or any renewal thereof, that the person to whom such
money or credit is extended or whose obligations the creditor is extended or whose
obligation the creditor is to acquire or finance, negotiate any policy or contract of
insurance through a particular insurer or group of insurers or agent or group of agents
or brokers.
IOWA CODE § 507B.5 (1981).
32. Because the Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970 specifically preclude ex-
plicit tie-in arrangements by subject banks and bank holding companies, the range of antitrust
law application is circumscribed. As the cases have suggested, with regard to bank and bank
holding company explicit ties, the determination of illegality is made by the agency in the first
instance, and such determination is subject to review by the federal courts. See, Indep. Ins.
Agents. v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 658 F.2d 571, 575 (8th Cir. 1981). While the 1970 Amendments
specifically referred to Clayton Act standards in prohibiting credit insurance ties, the matter is
essentially one for administrative agency procedures rather than judicial application of anti-
trust norms, and assertions of illegal tying by bank and bankholding companies usually arise in
the context of section 4(c), 12 U.S.C. Section 1843(c)(8) (1980), applications to provide non-
banking services. See Costner v. The Blount Natl Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) (identi-
fying similarity between Clayton Act and Bank Holding Compay Act standards).
However, it is equally clear that tie-in arrangements are being practiced by institutions
unregulated by the federal government, such as finance companies, credit unions, and automo-
bile dealerships. To the extent that these institutions practice explicit tie-in arrangements,
they raise important issues of antitrust law, which are addressed, in part, by the 1979 Hearings.
Moreover, the issue of implicit tie-ins and their impermissibility under the FRS regulations was
not expressly addressed in the 1979 Hearings. To the extent that implicit tying may be actiona-
ble under the antitrust laws, the federal courts should have the initial responsibility under the
antitrust laws.
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A. The FRS Study
In response to growing concern about alleged abuses in the marketing of
credit insurance by bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve authorized
a study on alleged tie-ins of credit and credit insurance. The study con-
sisted of a report on individual consumers' experience with and attitudes
toward credit insurance and a survey of policies and practices of a small
number of bank holding companies in marketing credit insurance.8
The theory of the study methodology was that coercive or involuntary
tying arrangements are related to or are expressions of supplier's market
power and so the existence of coercive ties would be demonstrated by buyer
resentment, poor consumer opinions about the product and complaints
about its quality and cost. " Similarly, the study considered penetration
rates in several submarkets for credit where tying may occur and reviewed
institutional policies and practices for marketing credit insurance in the
hopes of discerning organizational structures conducive to tying.85
In the first instance, the authors surveyed the range of tying situa-
tions-from an explicit, involuntary tie to a purely voluntary joint sale of
credit and credit insurance.8 ' For purposes of the study, the authors defined
"involuntary" as any joint sale where a degree of implicit pressure from the
creditor exists to the extent that a purchaser's insurance decision is influ-
enced or constrained by perceptions of the creditors' market power in the
credit business.87 Coercion, the process or perception of implicit or explicit
pressure, was thus an essential element of the study's calculation of the exis-
tence of tying arrangements. However, discerning coercion is difficult, and
the authors of the study suggested a relationship existing among penetration
rates, consumer perceptions of pressure to purchase and coercion.3
33. FRS Study, supra note 26, at 20-21.
34. Id. at 18-19.
35. Id. at 21.
Penetration rates represent the number of debtors obtaining credit insurance on credit
transactions expressed as a percentage of the total number of credit transactions surveyed. So,
for example, a penetration rate of 75% suggests that debtors obtained credit insurance in three
out of every four credit transactions.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id. at 28-29.
The authors of the study confess uncertainty concerning the ability of existing antitrust
standards to reach and declare illegal tying arrangements involving implicit pressures. Id. The
important point, however, is the nomenclature of decision-making by consumers. A tie-in may
be accomplished by an express provision in a contract or agreement and, from a legal perspec-
tive, proving such a tie-in is easier where it is explicit. However, a lender can impose a tie in an
implicit manner, such as by strongly suggesting the purchase of the tied product or by covertly
including credit insurance in the credit transaction without the debtor's knowledge or assent.
This presents other legal problems of proof, but does not necessarily alter the definition of a
tying arrangement, or, for that matter, its illegality.
38. Id. at 29-30
The authors state:
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Penetration rates across the credit markets ranged from 39% for retail-
ers extending credit to 75% for finance companies, with banks exhibiting
penetration rates of approximately 60%. The cross-industry average was
62% .s The significance of the datum is that approximately 62% of all bor-
In summary, for joint sales to constitute a potentially serious tying problem a precon-
dition is the existence of significant market power that may lead to supplier conduct
resulting in either explicit or implicit pressure on the customer to agree to a tied sale.
Systematically, this situation would be expected to result in high penetration rates by
the supplier in the tied market and would probably generate considerable consumer
resentment in response to the applied pressure. Even when there is no overt conduct
on the part of the supplier, an involuntary tying problem can exist if customers per-
ceive significant monopoly power in the tying goods or service and as a result involun-
tarily tie their purchases. In such a situation, high penetration rates would be ex-
pected and significant buyer resentment would probably exist. Presumably this
resentment would be directly related to the degree of monopoly power exerted by the
supplier through the setting of high prices.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 20.
The authors' study found the following penetration rates:
2. Insurance Status of Credit Transactions, by Type of Lender Number, except as noted
Finance Credit
Transactions Total Retailer Bank company union
Total 1,099 148 563 155 233
With credit
insurance
Number 684 59 346 116 163
Per cent 62.2 39.9 61.4 74.8 70.0
Without credit
insurance 323 68 182 25 48
Does not know or
not ascertained 92 21 35 14 22
3. Credit Insurance Status, by Type of Credit and Lender Per cent of loans
Type of credit and Finance Credit
insurance status Bank company union Retailer
New car
Credit insurance 60.0 87.5 69.0 63.2
No credit insurance 33.7 6.3 20.0 36.8
Does not know 2.6 2.1 9.0 0
Not ascertained 3.7 4.1 2.0 0
Used car
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rowers had purchased credit insurance in connection with their loan or
credit transaction. Although the authors conceded that these penetration
rates were high, on average and in several submarkets, they concluded that
the high rates were not due to coercive or involuntary tying.40 The survey of
consumer perceptions showed that 16.4% of the consumers surveyed stated
that the joint purchase was "required," 8.8% stated that it was "strongly
recommended" (apparently by the lender), and 25.7% stated that it was
"recommended." 41 Only 1.2% of consumers surveyed claimed to have re-
Credit insurance 66.3 69.0 76.6 52.9
No credit insurance 29.0 17.2 17.0 41.2
Does not know 4.1 10.3 2.1 5.9
Not ascertained 0.6 3.5 4.3 0
Home addition and repair
Credit insurance 55.6 33.3 55.6 33.3
No credit insurance 36.1 33.3 44.4 66.7
Does not know 5.6 0 0 0
Not ascertained 2.7 33.4 0 0
Durables and recreation
Credit insurance 61.2 56.7 65.5 35.1
No credit insurance 34.3 36.7 27.6 45.5
Does not know 3.0 6.6 6.9 16.9
Not ascertained 1.5 0 0 2.5
Personal loan
Credit insurance 59.0 80.0 70.8 32.1
No credit insurance 32.0 11.1 16.7 50.0
Does not know 6.0 8.9 8.3 7.1
Not ascertained 3.0 0 4.2 10.8
Id. at 46-47.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 48.
4. Consumer Perceptions of Creditors' Recommendations about Purchase of Credit Insurance
Perception Number Percent
Creditor never mentioned insurance 251 21.6
Mentioned but not recommended 192 16.5
Recommended 299 25.7
Strongly recommended 103 8.8
Required 191 16.4
Requested by consumer 14 1.2
Other 14 1.2
Does not know or not ascertained 99 8.5
Total 1.163 100.0
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quested credit insurance.42
The consumer study also suggested that a very small proportion of con-
sumers viewed credit insurance as a "bad" service, and that most regarded it
as a highly desirable commodity.43 Similarly, most consumers thought that
the price was "about right" or even "inexpensive."" Based upon these study
results, and the lack of consumer complaints in the files of the Federal Re-
serve System, the authors concluded that the relatively low proportion of
loan customers perceiving pressure to make joint purchases and the high
rate of customer approval of credit insurance and its cost suggested that the
high penetration rates were due to positive consumer attitudes and the hy-
pothesis that joint purchases were voluntary. 45
The authors also examined the "supply" side of the loan and credit in-
5. Consumer Perceptions of Creditors' Recommendations about Purchase of Credit Insurance,
by Type of Lender
Per cent
Finance Credit
Perception Bank company union Retailer
Creditor never mentioned insurance 20.2 12.3 17.2 40.5
Mentioned but not recommended 18.3 18.7 16.8 8.8
Recommended 28.2 26.5 22.4 23.0
Strongly recommended 11.4 11.6 5.6 4.7
Required 12.1 23.2 26.3 10.8
Requested by consumer .9 1.3 1.3 1.4
Other 1.2 .6 2.6 0
Does not know or not ascertained 7.6 5.8 7.8 10.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Details may not add to 100 per cent because of rounding. Id. at 48-49.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. at 20.
The consumer survey showed the following incident of consumer attitudes:
6. Consumer Attitudes toward Credit Insurance
Attitude Number Per cent
Good thing
Good with qualifications
Neither good nor bad
Bad with qualifications
Bad
Does not know or not ascertained
Total
44. Id. at 20.
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surance transaction to review institutional policies and practices relating to
alleged tying. This branch of the report was more narrow than the consumer
study in that it only sampled bank holding companies.'6 The authors con-
cluded that their study of the sample found that penetration rates were rel-
atively low, that the sale of credit insurance occurred after the sale of credit,
and that insurance agents in bank holding companies usually received fixed
salary compensation, rather than commission compensation. 47 Therefore, ac-
cording to the authors, these factors strongly supported their conclusion
that it is unlikely that coercive tying is practiced in the credit market ser-
viced by banks.48 They also opined that exogenous factors such as state and
federal regulatory constraints on the profitability of credit insurance re-
duced incentives to tie insurance to credit.49
B. The Vaughan Report
The Senate Committee also received a report prepared by Dr. Emmett
J. Vaughan,50 criticizing the FRS Study in several important respects. First,
Vaughan contended that the FRS Study did not properly consider the effect
of implicit pressure on consumers to obtain credit insurance in connection
46. Id. at 21.
It is understandable that this aspect of the study was more narrow than the consumer or
"demand" portion of the study. The Federal Reserve System, which conducted the study,
routinely gathers information on banks and bank holding company policies, procedures, and
organizational patterns. Further, the Board of Governors would not have ready access to that
information with respect to credit unions, finance companies, retailers, and other submarkets of
the credit industry. Moreover, the orientation of the study was to consider the existence of tie-
in arrangements in the banking industry, and not necessarily to consider the existence of tie-in
arrangements in other credit submarkets.
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id. at 22-23.
In conclusion, analysis of the surveys suggests that explicit tying between the
granting of credit and the sale of credit-related insurance is practically non-existent
and that implicit pressures brought by lenders on the borrowers are neither very
strong nor widespread in the industry. It does appear that a sizeable minority of
credit customers voluntarily places their property and casualty insurance with their
lender because they value the convenience of the joint purchase more than the bene-
fits they could obtain by successfully searching for alternative sources of insurance.
The proportion of people opting for joint purchases of credit and insurance is even
greater among those purchasing credit life and disability insurance probably because
the premium costs are small compared with search and shopping costs.
Id.
49. Id. at 21-22. The study did not, however, cite any substantial support for their conclu-
sion that regulatory restrictions "limit severely the profitability of insurance sales and blunt the
incentive to tie." Id.
50. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 310-52 [hereinafter cited as The Vaughan Report].
Dr. Vaughan, a professor of insurance at the University of Iowa, was retained by the Inde-
pendent Insurance Agents of America to review the FRS Study and submit his findings to the
Senate Committee. Id. at 301.
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with the purchase of credit.51 In particular, he contended that banks hold
unique power over their customers because the extension of credit is often
an ongoing relationship or series of transactions and because credit must
sometimes be "rationed" in times of tight supply to the "better" bank cus-
tomers.52 Vaughan also contested the FRS Study conclusion that, on aver-
age, 65% of loan customers also purchased credit insurance, and claimed
that, based upon other studies and methodological infirmities in the FRS
Study, the penetration rate could be as high as 98%.13
The Vaughan Report also attacked the FRS Study on certain critical
conclusions drawn by the bank regulators. First, Vaughan strongly disagreed
with the FRS conclusion that involuntary tying was "almost non-existent"
as drawn from the fact that only 16.4% of consumers perceived credit insur-
ance as "required."'" Vaughan, using the FRS statistics, suggested that the
inference of implicit, yet coercive, tying may be evidenced by the fact that
almost 51% of those surveyed stated that credit insurance was "required" or
"strongly recommended."5 5 Professor Vaughan expressed his belief that, in
practice, there is little distinction between explicit or coercive tie-ins and
implicit ones, and that "customers perceive the implicit threat of depriva-
tion of a needed bank service and submit to the recommendation to
purchase the insurance.""
Vaughan also attacked the assumption of the FRS Study that a compul-
sory tie-in requirement produced a negative consumer attitude toward the
product. He suggested that such a requirement may produce a negative atti-
tude toward the institution and, further, that the degree of resentment may
well reflect the cost of the insurance and the demand or desire for the loan.57
To the extent that this is true, it tends to undermine the implication drawn
by the FRS Study that there is a highly favorable consumer perception of
credit insurance.
In conclusion, Vaughan, using the FRS Study as supporting evidence,
argued "that at least one out of every six (and perhaps as many as one out
of every four) persons surveyed had been required to purchase credit insur-
ance in conjunction with extensions of credit," and that therefore the
51. Id. at 316-17.
52. Id. at 316.
53. Id. at 334-35.
In particular, Vaughan contended that there may be as many as 9% of the consumers
surveyed who had credit insurance but did not know it. Id. He also stated that the FRS Study
sampled many credit institutions, including some which did not sell any insurance or credit
insurance. Id. at 333. Obviously, the opportunities for tying are nonexistent in such circum-
stances. Finally, he noted a government study which found 97.5% of consumers that purchased
credit insurance had purchased it through the creditor. Id. at 333-34.
54. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
55. Vaughan Report, supra note 50, at 336-37.
56. Id. at 316-17.
57. Id. at 326-31.
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Study's conclusion that credit insurance tie-ins are "practically non-exis-
tent" merely serves to obscure important policy issues concerning bank
practices and federal legislation."
C. The FTC Report
The Federal Trade Commission also filed a brief report which was high-
ly critical of the FRS Study, although for somewhat different reasons than
Dr. Vaughan's.59 In the first instance, the FTC claimed that the FRS Study
penetration rates were "unreliable" and significantly lower than FTC stud-
ies on finance companies.60 The FTC Report also stated that a consumer
study showed that almost 40% of retail credit customers did not know that
they had credit insurance when in fact they did. 1 This fact, according to the
FTC, suggests that the consumer perception survey in the FRS Report may
have significantly understated the penetration rates in many credit
submarkets.62
On a more substantive basis, the FTC Report took issue with the FRS
Study in two important respects. First, the FTC stated that joint sales when
credit is tight do not constitute a "voluntary" tie-in because the consumer
perception of the availability of credit is tied to the lender's power over the
available supply of loan reserves and, more important, this may constitute
an "incipient violation of the antitrust laws."'63 Second, the FTC Report sets
forth the agency's position that a 25% rate of involuntary or coercive tie-ins
"is not only significant but unacceptable."" The FTC, like Dr. Vaughan,
expressed grave concern that the FRS Study could be misconstrued to sug-
gest that the likelihood of prevalent tying in markets for credit is low.
58. Id. at 352.
59. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 122-29 [hereinafter cited as FTC Report].
60. Id. at 122.
The FTC attached a recent study of penetration rates collected from consumer finance
companies by the Commission staff. The study showed, on a state-by-state basis, penetration
rates ranging between 90% and 100%. Id. at 123; see 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 361-62.
The FTC explained the substantial discrepancy in penetration rate ranges by pointing to cer-
tain methodological errors in the FRS survey. FTC Report, supra note 59, at 123. These much
higher penetration rates were confirmed by a consumer advocate group. 1979 Hearings, supra
note 3, at 279 (Statement of Robert Sable).
61. FTC Report, supra note 59, at 124.
62. Id.
According to the Commission report, the FRS Study treated individuals reporting that
they had no credit insurance as not purchasing credit insurance. However, if almost 40% had
credit insurance but did not know it, then the FRS penetration rates were vastly understated
and, more importantly, the likelihood of coercive tying is significantly understated where as
many as 40% of credit insurance sales are made without the purchasers' knowledge. Id. See
also 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 278 (Statement of Robert Sable) (adjusting FRS Study
penetration rates for misperceiving customers).
63. Id. at 126.
64. Id.
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D. Significance of Senate Hearings
The debate over the FRS Study, and the content of the Study, is signif-
icant to an analysis of the antitrust implications of credit insurance tying
arrangements. First, and most important, the senate hearings provide some
raw data with which to tentatively explore the suitability of antitrust analy-
sis to the joint sale of credit and credit insurance. Penetration rates, levels
of misunderstanding by purchasers and consumer perceptions of the desira-
bility of credit insurance are critical facts in understanding not only the
likelihood of prevalent credit tying, but also the adaptability of antitrust
standards to the consumer credit field. For example, low consumer percep-
tions of the usefulness of credit insurance in light of high penetration rates
of joint sales may be sufficient proof of a coercive tying situation. Similarly,
high penetration rates may suggest economic power in one or more markets
for credit; conversely, they may merely indicate high consumer acceptance
of two complimentary and desired products.
Second, a consideration of tying analysis in the discrete setting of credit
and credit insurance transactions may permit a critical analysis of current
antitrust standards and a tentative explication of further refinements of
those standards. Consumer protection laws, as currently written and en-
forced, may be insufficient instruments of a policy to protect consumers,
and, if there exists some likelihood that competitive market structures and
performance were being adversely affected by tying conduct, then a strong
argument for antitrust enforcement may be advanced.
Third, the datum also suggests certain conclusions concerning the de-
gree and effectiveness of state and federal regulation of credit and insurance
institutions and the prevalence of tying behavior. These conclusions have
significance not only from the perspective of appropriate policy choices, but
also in considering the applicability of exemptions and immunities from the
antitrust laws.
IV. TIE-IN ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Tie-in arrangements have long been considered illegal under the federal
antitrust laws."5 Since International Salt," the courts have consistently
65. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int'l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
66. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the
Court defined a tie-in as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a differee (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier." 356 U.S. at 5-6.
The first, or preferred, product is termed the "tying product," while the conditional prod-
uct is called the "tied" product. To establish the first element to a tying arrangement, it must
be demonstrated that a vendor in fact has "two separate products." See Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Fortner I]. This
requires a consideration of the relationship between the tying and tied products, the individu-
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condemned contracts or agreements by which the sale of one product is con-
ditioned upon the sale of another product. Before finding the contract or
agreement illegal, there must be a tie between two separate products," proof
that the defendant's activity has affected a not insubstantial amount of
commerce in the market for the tied product,6 8 and evidence that the defen-
dant has substantial economic power in the market for the tying prod-
uct.ssAn additional requirement to a per se tying case, coercion of the pur-
chaser, is sometimes added by the courts, especially in class action
lawsuits.7 0
ally or independent utility of each product, and customer perceptions of, or demand for, the
products. See Hirsch v. Martindale Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1982);
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 1980). See generally, Blair & Finci,
The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 531, 535-36 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Blair & Finci].
67. See, Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501, 507.
68. Id. at 501.
This requirement in antitrust litigation contemplates a demonstration that the amount of
commerce foreclosed to competitors in the market for the tied product is not insubstantial or
de minimus in dollar amount. The Court, in Fortner I, stated that, for effect on commerce
purposes, "the relevant figure is total amount of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge,
not the portion of this total accounted for the particular plaintiff who brings suit." Id. at 502.
Therefore, in an antitrust action brought by an individual debtor claiming that the creditor
tied the sale of credit to a sale of credit insurance, the court would look to the creditor's total
sales of credit insurance made pursuant to a tie-in policy for purposes of demonstrating inter-
state commerce. If the creditor has made sales in excess of $60,000 this will be sufficient to
meet this requirement. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962).
69. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Fortner II]; Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981);
Bogus v. Am. Speech and Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1978).
70. Compare Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d at 1131, with Bogus v. Am.
Speech and Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d at 287. See also, Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1983) (coercion doctrine in non-class action context).
Where a tying arrangement is explicitly imposed on the buyer by express contractual
terms, proof of coercion is generally not required. Bogus, 582 F.2d at 287. There are, however,
significant problems concerning proof of a tie-in where the alleged conditioning of the sale of
one product to the purchase of another is implicit, unarticulated or inferred. See Bauer, A
Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VND. L.
REv. 283, 308-14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bauer, Simplified Approach]. See also Varner,
Voluntary Ties and Sherman Act, 50 S. CAL. L. Rav. 271 (1977). The problems are essentially
twofold. First, since proof of some agreement or conspiracy is necessary to establish jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act, some type of agreement to purchase both goods must be shown.
Second, the plaintiff must offer proof that the defendant offered to sell the tying product only
on the condition that the plaintiff purchased the tied product; that is, that there was in fact a
tie-in arrangement rather than the voluntary purchase of two products by the customer. See
Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1983); Blair & Finci,
supra note 66, at 556-61.
The issue of commonality in class action litigation has created additional difficulties in
proof of coercive or involuntary joint sales and, in many cases, the courts have required more
stringent proof of individual coercion prior to class certification. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1219 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1979). See
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Once these elements have been established, it is often stated that the
plaintiff has established a case of "per se" illegality under the antitrust
laws. 7' The per se rule in antitrust litigation is one of expediency and clar-
ity. It is a conclusive presumption that certain types of conduct or restric-
tive activities have little or no redeeming value and that in most applica-
tions the restrictive practices harm competition.' Tying arrangements,
however, have been treated somewhat differently than traditional per se of-
fenses because the courts have permitted, in limited circumstances, the as-
sertion of justifications for the tie-in .7  Although the conceptual process of
reconciling the existence and availability of justifications with a per se rule
is difficult, it is clear that defendants in tying cases will be permitted to
assert defenses or justifications for the tying arrangement, as where the tie-
in is the least restrictive method of protecting manufacturer goodwill in the
tying product,74 or where joint use of a competitor's product harms the tying
product,75 or where a tying arrangement facilitates new entry into a mar-
ket.7 6 Although these justifications or defenses have been given limited ap-
plication, their potential use in virtually every tying situation suggests the
erosion of the per se rule in tying cases and the advancement of reasonable-
also Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VAND. L. REv. 755
(1977).
71. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 1.
72. See Ariz. v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
There are a number of business activities which have been accorded per se illegality treat-
ment under the antitrust laws. These include price-fixing (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)), horizontal territorial divisions (United States v. Topco Associ-
ates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)) and group boycotts (United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966)).
Classically, the per se rule has been defined by the Supreme Court, in Northern Pacific
Railway, as follows:
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unrea-
sonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sher-
man Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
356 U.S. at 5.
73. See generally Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 325-27.
74. See, e.g., Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hoasp. District, 686 F.2d 286, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1982);
Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1977); Northern v. Mc-
Graw Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977).
75. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
76. Id. See Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 326-27.
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ness analysis.17
With this brief background of the antitrust analysis of tying arrange-
ments, attention is directed to elements or aspects of the analysis which are
implicated by credit insurance tie-ins to sales of credit. Although other ele-
ments of a tying arrangement case may present legal and factual issues in an
antitrust action," there are three principal matters for consideration. The
first is an examination of legal and economic theories for imposition of tying
arrangements and their application to the credit and credit insurance mar-
kets. The second matter involves a more particularized review of economic
power in the market for the tying produced. This review requires careful
77. See Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian
Knot, 66 VA. L. REv. 1235 (1980); Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70; Turner, The
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958).
Unlike the rule of per se illegality, the rule of reason contemplates a detailed analysis of
the commercial justifications, historical motivations, and economic effects of the activity, and a
more substantial burden of persuasion on the antitrust plaintiff. National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
It is perhaps significant to note that while the per se rule is generally applicable to tying
cases, the reasonableness standard is always available to test the appropriateness of joint sales,
such as where the plaintiff cannot demonstrate the defendant's market power or coercive be-
havior. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 499-500 (1969); Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
730 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. For example, a lender may claim that the credit insurance was not issued by the
lender, but rather by an independent insurer. Of course, where different vendors provide the
tying and tied products, there is no tying arrangement. If, however, the lender and insurer are
in a parent-subsidiary relationship, such as a captive insurer and a finance company or a bank,
the courts would conclude that a single vendor is making sales of both credit and insurance.
See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 507 & n.4. See generally Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld
Corp., 1981-82 Trade Cas.(CCH) 64,969 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1983).
Similarly, where the lender issues credit insurance pursuant to a group life policy, an issue of
different sellers may arise. In that situation the creditor is the insurance policy holder and not
an agent of the insurer, although the creator is the vendor of the credit insurance. See supra
note 8. Cases arising in the franchise context where franchisors have committed their franchis-
ees to purchases of materials from third parties indicate that courts will treat the situation as a
tie-in arrangement. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228 (1968); Shell Oil v. FTC,
360 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
Another potential issue concerns the amount of interstate commerce in the tied product.
However, as previously discussed, it seems unlikely to present a substantial impediment be-
cause the aggrieved purchaser can aggregate all sales of the tied product made pursuant to the
tying policy and the threshold amount is relatively insignificant. See supra note 68.
Finally, questions may arise concerning statutory jurisdiction over a tying arrangement
case. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 3 of the Clayton Act, and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act are generally applicable to tie-in cases. Bauer, Simplified Approach,
supra note 70, at 285. The broadest statutory vehicle, section 5 of the FTC Act, can only be
enforced by the Commission, not private parties. See Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1973). Further, section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to "goods. . . or other com-
modities," which would not include financing, insurance or credit transactions. However, sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act has been applied to cases involving intangible products, such as
credit. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 495.
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attention to the Fortner litigation in the United States Supreme Court and
a consideration of economic power in credit markets. Finally, coercion as a
substantive issue and a procedural requirement in credit tying cases is
considered.
A. Theories of Tying Arrangements
There are several legal and economic theories concerning the reasons for
and effects of tying arrangements. As might be expected, these theories are
often divergent and conflicting, but they focus attention on the probable
anticompetitive, or beneficial, effects of tie-ins. Perhaps more important, the
theories require consideration because the Supreme Court has strongly sug-
gested that fundamental to finding a tying arrangement illegal is a cogent
explanation of its economic perniciousness."
The Supreme Court, in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States,80
stated that tying arrangements accomplish two pernicious effects: foreclo-
sure of competitors' access to purchasers and coercion of purchasers. Thus,
tying arrangements are frequently condemned for the disparate reasons that
they unfairly infringe upon competitive behavior and may impair the main-
tenance and continuance of economically efficient market structures and
performance.81 It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never
79. Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 621-22.
80. 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). In Northern Pacific Railway, the Court defined those effects as
follows:
For our purposes a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to
sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any
other supplier. Where such conditions are successfully exacted competition on the
merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed. Indeed "tying agree-
ments serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." They deny
competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because the party
imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of
his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego.
their free choice between competing products.
Id. at 5-6 (citations and footnotes omitted).
There are two main manifestations of the foreclosure effect of a tying arrangement. First, it
may prevent present competitors from having access to customers, and second, it may impede
the development of potential competition in either (or both) product market(s) by erecting
entry barriers. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 287-88. Opportunities for entry
may be limited by the appearance that minimum competitive scale requires the sale of both the
tying and tied product, or by the threat of predatory conduct in the market. See Craswell,
Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L. REv.
661, 670 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Craswell, Tying in Competitive Markets]; Edwards, Eco-
nomics of "Tying" Arrangements: Some Proposed Guidelines for Bank Holding-Company
Regulation, 6 ANTrUST L. & EcoN. REv. 87, 98 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
81. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRusT § 152, at 445 (1977).
(T]he hostility to tying embodied in the Act and reflected in the cases may have more
to do with notions of appropriate competitive behavior (conceptions about fair oppor-
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accorded any weight or relative significance between these objectionable ef-
fects or, for that matter, suggested that a particular tying arrangement must
exhibit both effects before it may be condemned as per se illegal.
Economic rationales for tying arrangements are quite varied and fall
into four principal categories. First, it has been argued that tying arrange-
ments permit the leveraging of economic power in the market for the tying
product into the tied product market.8s According to theory, this permits
the proponent of the tie to extract a second supracompetitive profit in the
market for the tied product and to create a monopoly in that market. Other
commentators have argued that the prospect of recovering excessive profits
in two markets is very unlikely and that the vendor's ability to garner a
second monopoly in the tied product market has nothing to do with its abil-
ity to monopolize or exert economic power in the tying product market.8s
Second, it has been contended that tying arrangements are convenient
methods of capturing consumer surplus caused by differing marginal utili-
ties for the tying product and the legal constraints on price discrimination."
tunity or access) and with the polar concepts of coercion and free choice, than it has
to do with the efficiency or allocation consequences of competitive structure and
process.
Id.
82. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Bowman, Leverage Problem]. See also Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra
note 70, at 292-93, 298-305.
83. See R. BORE, THE ANTITRUST PAADox 365-81 (1978); R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976); Bowman, Leverage Problem, supra note 82, at 29-36.
The argument, essentially, is that the ability to monopolize or control prices is directly
related to individual demand elasticities for the tying product and the tied product, and absent
totally inelastic demand in both markets, an increase in the price of one product will result in
the decrease in the price of the other. In other words, the ability to exact supranormal profits or
to extend monopoly power into an another market is constrained by individual demands for
both products.
It has been argued, however, that the leverage effect occurs in occasional circumstances,
and that even without an intention of monopolizing the tied product market, a seller may be
able to actualize a strategy of foreclosure. See Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at
298-305. A seller may impose tie-ins as a "revenue-maximization" (or cost-minimization) mea-
sure, rather than to achieve a monopoly, but irrespective of the vendor's motive, competitors
may be foreclosed from competition in markets and buyers' range of choice may be limited. Id.
84. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 293-94; Burstein, A Theory of Full-
Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960).
The aspects to this theory concern first, that consumer surplus is created whenever the
demand schedule for a product is sloping downward and there are marginal utilities for the
product above its market price. A second aspect is that price discrimination laws, or rational
market behavior, prohibit making sales match marginal utility value, which effectively means
that some consumers will purchase the product at a price below their utility value, and in the
aggregate, the vendor foregoes the consumer surplus, and additional profits. See PosNER & EAs-
TERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND GrHM MATERIALS, 804-09 (2d ed. 1981).
Tying arrangements permit the vendor to effect price discrimination and garner the consumer
surplus by charging an above normal price for the tied product and a below monopoly price for
the tying product. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 293-94; Edwards, supra note
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Therefore, the two-product vendor uses the tied product as a metering de-
vice to test the intensity of purchaser interest in the tying product. By
charging an above normal price for the tied product, the vendor recoups
monopoly profits foregone on sales of the tying product and garners other-
wise foregone consumer surplus.' 5
Third, tying arrangements may be useful in avoiding price constraints
imposed on the tying product, such as by government-imposed price ceilings
or floors, or similarly, in rationing tight supplies of the tying product where
normal market mechanisms are inapplicable or superseded. 6 Finally, tying
may permit a multi-product vendor to achieve economies of scale in the sell-
ing of two products as a package, and similarly, may enhance protection of
the vendor's goodwill in the tying product.8"
In the specific context of credit insurance tying, several of the theories
of tying arrangements may explain the existence and persistence of credit
insurance tie-in arrangements. First, joint sales of credit and credit insur-
ance may merely represent a method of lowering transaction costs, such as
consumer search costs and lenders' administrative expenses, which are asso-
ciated with package transactions involving complex goods."' The benefit to
lenders of the joint sales is clear in this situation; the consumer savings,
however, if any, are less clear. The ability of such joint sales to lower con-
sumer transaction costs presupposes high independent consumer interest in
credit insurance, but the Vaughan Study and the FTC Report indicate great
customer indifference to, or ignorance of, the existence of credit insurance in
their credit transaction.8' In other words, ameliorating search and other
transaction costs becomes significant only after a consumer has indepen-
dently expressed a interest in the product.
Second, credit insurance tying, and the growth of affiliated lender and
insurance companies, may indicate the operation of a leveraging concept as
80, at 92-96.
85. See Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 293-94; Craswell, Tying in Com-
petitive Markets, supra note 80, at 668-69.
86. See Markovits, Tie-ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58
Tex. L. R v. 1363, 1383-85 (1980); Edwards, supra note 80, at 89-95; Bowman, Leverage Prob-
lem, supra note 82, at 21.
87. See Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 296; Bowman, Leverage Problem,
supra note 82, at 29.
88. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (comments of John Heimann, Comptroller of
the Currency).
The FRS Study suggests as much in its conclusion "that a sizeable minority of credit cus-
tomers voluntarily place their property and casualty insurance with their lender because they
value the convenience of the joint purchase more than the benefits they could obtain by suc-
cessfully searching for alternative sources of insurance." FRS Study, supra note 26, at 22. The
authors concluded that this explanation was even more significant in the case of credit life and
disability insurance because the premium costs are small compared with search and shopping
costs." Id. at 22-23.
89. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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credit providers attempt to extend the market power they hold in markets
for credit into the market for credit insurance. However, in a general and
national sense, the market for credit appears to have a great many members,
such as banks, finance companies, and retailers and many of them provide
credit insurance. Given the significant number of credit institutions, a ra-
tional objective of gaining and exercising power in the market for credit
seems implausible, although it is becoming increasingly important for par-
ticipants in those markets to maintain product lines of both credit and in-
surance." Similarly the growth in captive insurers, whose only function is to
insure credit transactions by the affiliated financial institution, may suggest
greater opportunities for market leveraging. However, since state usury laws
govern credit rates, and state insurance commissions are supposed to moni-
tor agent commission provisions and insurance premium rates, the opportu-
nities for collection of supracompetitive profits in either (or both) markets
may be substantially diminished."'
The fact of regulatory oversight of interest rates, however, suggests a
more plausible explanation for credit insurance tying. As suggested by the
Vaughan Study and the FTC Report, credit tying may be a method of
avoiding interest ceilings imposed by state usury laws." In a tight market
for credit, a debtor would pay the prevailing interest rate on the loan, al-
90. Indeed, the entire background for the 1979 Hearings involves strong insurance indus-
try reaction to a growing movement of banks and bank holding companies into insurance mar-
kets. See Schweitzer & Halbrook, supra note 19, at 750-59.
The large number of credit providing institutions, and the seeming implausibility of credi-
tor strategies to monopolize national or regional credit market, should not obscure the facts,
discussed subsequently, that there are many local or territorial "submarkets" for credit and
that antitrust analysis may require careful consideration of both relevant product markets and
relevant geographic markets to determine market power and anticompetitive effects. See Note,
Credit As a Tying Product, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1446-47 (1969).
91. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 577-80 (Statement of Golembe Associates).
This point is subject to a number of important qualifications. First, some lenders, such as
finance companies, are not subject to the same degree of regulatory oversight as other lenders,
for example, banks. Secondly, usury laws vary significantly among the states, both with respect
to their limits and to their very ezistence. See generally Note, Usury Legislation-Its Effects
on the Economy and A Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 199, 206-8 (1980). Recently,
more states are lifting restrictions on credit interest charges on non-revolving credit arrange-
ments. Third, state regulation of insurance practice varies widely, and consistent, strong en-
forcement is certainly not the norm. These qualifications merely suggest that a leveraging strat-
egy may explain the existence of credit tying arrangements in some discrete situations.
92. The Vaughan Report, supra note 50, at 317-18. Vaughan suggests that price ceilings
on interest rates may not permit lenders to raise prices to a point where the supply of credit
equals its demand, particularly in tight money situations. Obviously, a tight money situation
gives a lender with a supply of money some greater economic power over its competitors who do
not have such resources. However, because of state usury laws, a lender having an excess supply
is unable to take advantage of the relatively inelastic demand for its money unless it can re-
cover the value of the excess demand in some other manner, such as by tying arrangements. Id.
See also Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins: Where Banks Stand After the Fortner Decisions, 95 BANK-
ING L.J. 419, 441 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins].
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though absent the usury ceiling the creditor could obtain a higher market
rate, plus some added amount for premiums on the credit insurance. In this
situation, assuming that credit insurance premium rates are inordinately
high, the creditor-insurer can capture a price on the credit which is above
the ceiling price and closer to (and perhaps in excess of) a "market" price.
Conclusions concerning the effectiveness of this strategy would require, in
each instance, consideration of the relative price of credit insurance from
the lender, availability of other sources of credit, and the proximity of the
lender's interest rates to usury limits.'
8
Another plausible theory of tying considers credit insurance sales as a
method of price discrimination to impose more stringent credit terms on
low-income individuals who are simultaneously more vulnerable to coercive
credit practices and less able to find alternative sources of credit." Thus,
although the market for credit may be described as competitive because
there are many vendors, for some classes of debtors there may be very little
choice with respect to sources of credit. Creditors providing credit to low-
income individuals may find it beneficial to impose additional terms or con-
ditions on customers who, as a practical matter, have no (or few) alternative
sources of credit.
These theories do not necessarily presuppose that tying occurs for any
or all of the suggested reasons. It does, however, suggest that there may be
economic reasons for engaging in tying behavior in many consumer credit
situations. Whether or not a lender is able to indulge in tying behavior, and
make such behavior profitable, depends in significant part upon its market
power.
B. Market Power and the Fortner Litigation
In an antitrust case under the Sherman Act, it must be demonstrated
that the vendor has substantial economic power in the market for the tying
product.' 5 If the purchaser cannot demonstrate that the vendor has appreci-
able economic power in that market, the case may still proceed under the
broader rule of reason analysis." However, the proof of appreciable eco-
93. See generally Edwards, supra note 80, at 95-97.
94. See infra notes 148-50.
95. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610 (1977); Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Hyde v. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982); Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660
F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1981).
96. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501; Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).
Cf. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70.
In a recent article, it was argued that antitrust tying analysis in competitive, or nearly
competitive, markets is too imprecise to accomplish public policy objectives and that consumer
protection legislation is more appropriate to control abuses in these markets. Craswell, Tying
in Competitive Markets, supra note 80, at 663-64. Therefore, according to the author, the anti-
trust laws should be displaced in favor of consumer protection norms and that neither form of
antitrust analysis was an appropriate tool of government policy in this area. Id. at 700. The
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nomic power is neither precise nor uniform, and the courts have considered
several indicia of market power as sufficient to demonstrate this element.
In the most obvious instance, economic power may be shown by a pat-
ent or copyright on the tying product.97 Since an underlying concern of
Sherman Act analysis in the area of tying arrangements is the improper ex-
ercise of monopoly power, economic power in the tying product may also be
demonstrated by "comparative marketing data" showing the vendor's rela-
tive dominance in the market.98 For example, in Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States,"9 the government attacked, under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, a newspaper publisher's requirement that advertisements in
the morning paper also be carried in that publisher's afternoon paper. The
Court concluded that the vendor's sales of forty percent of newspaper adver-
tising did not confer sufficient market dominance to be actionable.100
Economic power may also be demonstrated by the vendor's ability to
impose the tie in all or many of the transactions involving the tying product.
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,1'0 the Court found that
the Railway, which had been accused of tying transportation agreements to
the sales and leases of land adjacent to its tracks, had substantial economic
power because "several million acres" of land was subject to the tie-in.10'
The Court held that "the very existence" of the tremendous number of ty-
adequacy of this view is, however, dependent upon a couple of factors. First, the ability to
measure, with even rough precision, whether or not a market is "competitive" is relevant. Sec-
ond, whether market power analysis in any case permits rational and consistent judgments
about the applicability of antitrust or consumer protection laws, and by whom will those judg-
ments be made. And, third, the ability of consumer protection laws and enforcement officials to
adequately protect consumer choice and competitive entry.
97. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See also Dam, Fortner
Enterprise v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 SuP. CT. REV.
1, 19-23 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dam, Fortner I].
98. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
99. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
100. Id. at 611.
The Court analyzed a broad array of statistical information concerning total and relative
sales of advertising linage by the various newspapers in the New Orleans area, relative foreclo-
sure rates attributable to the defendants' tying policies, and the effect of the policies on reve-
nues. Id. at 615-22.
101. 356 U.S. 1 (1957).
102. Id. at 7.
The tying arrangement in Northern Pacific Ry. was somewhat unique in that the agree-
ments selling or leasing the land contained "preferential routing clauses which compelled the
grantee or lessee to ship over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the land,
provided that its rates (and in some instances its service) were equal to those of competing
carriers." Id. at 3.
It has been suggested that the provision waiving the tie may have been a device to facili-
tate collusion by the railroads. Cummings and Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L. &
EcoN. 329, 341-43 (1979). It has also been argued that the "preferential routing" clauses were
methods of offering rate reductions to potential shippers without running afoul of ICC rate
regulations. R. BORK, THE AN rrRusr PARADox at 376.
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ing arrangements was "compelling evidence" of the Railway's economic
power. 10
3
The requisite market power may be inherent in the nature of the tying
product, such as where it has "uniqueness in attributes" or "desirability to
customers." 1"' For example, in the Northern Pacific Railway case, the Court
observed that the tying product (land), was adjacent to railroad track facili-
ties and was "strategically located" and "often prized by those who pur-
chased or leased it and frequently essential to their business activities."10 5
Similarly, in United States v. Loew's Inc.,10 1 a case involving block-booking
of films, the Court held that a more intuitive, and less rigorous, review of
the tying product's appeal to customers may be permissible, and, in that
case, it was obvious that artistic variations made each film unique.'07
The theme of a tying product's uniqueness was applied to the market
for loans or credit in the Fortner litigation.1 0 8 In the 1950's, the Homes Divi-
sion of United States Steel Corp. (Homes Division), which sold packaged or
prefabricated homes, determined to increase its penetration of the housing
market in the Louisville, Kentucky, area by, among other things, stressing
favorable credit arrangements through its Homes Credit Corporation
(Credit Corporation).109 It approached a local builder and developer, Fort-
ner, to construct a U.S. Steel homes subdivision, and extended discussions
and negotiations ensued between Fortner and the Homes Division. 1 0 In es-
sential part, the arrangement contemplated 100% financing of the Fortner's
project by U.S. Steel Credit at a six percent interest rate, and the loans were
to be made by way of advances to Fortner for use as working capital. Fol-
lowing a deterioration and breakdown in relations between the parties,
Fortner filed suit against the Homes Division and Credit Corporation, claim-
ing that they conspired to force him to purchase U.S. Steel homes "at artifi-
cially high prices" by tying them to extensions of credit by Credit
Corporation."'
103. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 7-8.
104. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. at 45.
105. 356 U.S. at 7.
106. 371 U.S. 38 (1958).
107. Id. at 45.
108. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 47; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 507. See Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins,
supra note 92.
109. The Credit Corporation, a wholly-owned division of United States Steel, was estab-
lished in the mid-1950's solely for the purpose of providing financing credit in conjunction with
the sale of homes by the Homes Division. However, Credit Corporation financed not only the
houses but also the purchase of land upon which the houses were located. See Dam, Fortner I,
supra note 97, at 3.
110. Id. at 3-8.
In an influential article on Fortner I, Dam makes an important note that Fortner was a
skilled and apparently successful businessman who actively negotiated the terms of the agree-
ment with Credit Corporation and the Homes Division. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 6-8.
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Following discovery, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted by the trial court. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
grant of summary judgment, in what may be considered a strong admonition
against granting summary judgment in complex antitrust cases." 2 On the
issue of proof of "sufficient market power" in credit, the tying product, the
Court utilized a two-pronged review of the lower court decision. First, the
Court implied that the defendants may have sufficient economic power
merely because they in fact were able to impose the tie-in on "any apprecia-
ble number of buyers within the market."'1 8 More significantly, the Court
indicated that the defendant's credit may be "unique" in relation to its com-
petitors' available supply of credit and that the uniqueness may stem from
legal limitations on its competition or from the vast size of the parent, U.S.
Steel. 1 4 Although not clearly articulated, the Court indicated that universal
or wholesale imposition of the tying arrangement was not necessary, but
merely that:
despite the freedom of some or many buyers from the seller's power,
other buyers-whether few or many, whether scattered throughout the
market or part of some group within the market-can be forced to accept
the higher price because of their stronger preference for the product, and
the seller could therefore choose instead to force them to accept a tying
arrangement that would prevent free competition for their patronage in
the market for the tied product.""
The Court in Fortner I held that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to demonstrate
that the terms and interest rate of the credit were unique and that the uni-
Apparently, the breakdown in relations between United States Steel and Fortner was pre-
cipitated by a substantial number of complaints concerning the prefab houses shipped by the
Homes Division. Id. Fortner's lawsuit alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 7.
112. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 500. See, Note, Credit as a Tying Product, 69 COLUM. L. Rzv.
1435 (1969).
Justice Black, writing for the Court, cautioned that summary dismissal standards are too
insensitive for review of antitrust cases. See also Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
368 U.S. 464 (1962). Notwithstanding the clear pronouncement against summary judgment, the
Court did not reverse solely on the procedural standard, but further considered the issue of
demonstrating economic power in a tying arrangement case. Id. at 504-09.
113. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 504.
114. Id. at 505-06.
One theme underscoring the Court's analysis of economic power in the tying product was
the vast size of United States Steel. Id. at 509. The Court stated that U.S. Steel was a "big
company with vast sums of money in its treasury," which perhaps suggests judicial concern
about predation in the market for credit by the defendants. Id. If predation was a concern,
however, it was largely unarticulated by the Court. See Dam, Fortner I, supra note 97, at 26-28.
Instead, the Court's opinion conveys strong, but critically unexamined or explained, concerns
about the parent's size in the steel industry. Id. at 509.
115. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 503-04.
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queness permitted the defendants to force the plaintiff into the simultane-
ous purchase of prefab homes. The Court also stated that even if the plain-
tiff could not demonstrate the defendants' market power in the market for
credit, the plaintiff must still have an opportunity to prove illegality of the
joint sale under the rule of reason.116
Following remand to the district court, which found that the defendants
possessed economic power in the market for the tying product, and which
was affirmed on appeal, 1 7 the Supreme Court reviewed issues concerning
credit as a tying product afid the degree of uniqueness necessary for a find-
ing of market power. 18 Fortner advanced essentially four arguments con-
cerning the defendants' market power. First, that Credit Corporation was
owned by one of the largest firms in the country; second, that Credit Corpo-
ration had imposed ties on significant numbers of customers; third, that
Homes Division charged a non-competitive price for the prefab homes; and,
finally, that the 100% financing was "unique."
1 1 9
In contradistinction to its decision in Fortner I, the Court in Fortner II
required the plaintiff to prove sufficient theoretical and economic underpin-
nings for the assertions of economic power.' In the first place, the Court
held that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the relationship
between the Homes Division and Credit Corporation gave the latter any
power in the credit market.12 1 In fact the evidence tended to show that
Credit Corporation was not particularly profitable and that its real corpo-
rate function was a mere accommodation to customers of the Homes Divi-
sion."" The Court also debunked the argument that power was demon-
strated by the significant number of ties by the defendants, although its
reasoning was curious. 23 Justice Stevens pointed to the prevalent economic
116. Id. at 500.
Further, the plaintiffs in Fortner I argued that uniqueness could be demonstrated by the
terms of credit and financing offered by the defendants. Dam, Fortner I, supra note 97, at 27.
However, Justice Black's opinion carried a note of caution to the plaintiff:
We do not mean to accept petitioner's apparent argument that market power can be
inferred simply because the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are
"unique and unusual." We do mean, however, that uniquely and unusually advanta-
geous terms can reflect a creditor's unique economic advantages over his competitors.
Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505. This admonition, and Fortner's failure to heed it, proved to be
critical as the litigation progressed back through the federal courts.
117. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975).
118. Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610 (1977). See generally Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins, supra note
92, at 420-34.
119. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 614.
120. Dam, Fortner I, supra note 97, at 8-10.
121. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 615.
122. Id. at 615, 617 n.4.
123. Id. at 617-18.
The Court first stated that imposition of a significant number of tie-ins by the defendants
says nothing concrete about their economic power in the credit market, and that the credit tie-
in by the defendants did not fit accepted notions of "economic leverage." Id. at 617. It is note-
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theory that tie-ins are methods of accomplishing leverage between markets
or of accomplishing price discrimination, but concluded that Fortner made
no agreement to purchase "varying quantities of the tied product (prefab
homes) over an extended period of time. '' 124 Clearly, the Court signaled the
need for a sound economic rationale underlying a plaintiff's claim of tying,
and the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence supporting a claim that the
defendant had power in the tying product market.
The Court also attacked Fortner's contention that the relatively high
price on the U.S. Steel homes demonstrated market power, by suggesting
that this fact may be "consistent with the possibility that the financing was
unusually inexpensive and that the price for the entire package was equal
to, or below, a competitive price. '1 12s Moreover, the Court stated that this
possibility remained unchallenged by Fortner, irrespective of the fact that
the Homes Division made a number of joint sales.1 s6 Instead of relying upon
certain quantitative factors which Fortner claimed demonstrated the defen-
dants' market power in credit, the Court tossed additional evidentiary hur-
dles at the plaintiff, most notably a responsibility to dispel all inferences
that the tying arrangements were intended to enhance price competition in
worthy that the Court did not attempt to accommodate the U.S. Steel credit tie to other eco-
nomic theories of tying. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
However, in discussing Fortner's argument that excessive prices on the homes was evidence
of economic power, the Court revised the "host of tying arrangements" approach advanced by
the Court in Northern Pacific Railway, but held that approach "depends upon the absence of
other explanations for the willingness of buyers to purchase the package." Id. at 618, n.10. The
Court then distinguished the Northern Pacific Railway case by stating that "this case differs
from Northern Pacific because use of the tie-in in this case can be explained as a form of price
competition in the tied product, whereas that explanation was unavailable to the Northern
Pacific Railway." Id.
In viewing the tying transaction as a "package purchase of homes and financing," the
Court curiously placed an additional burden on the plaintiff to negate any possible inference
that the tie-in had procompetitive attributes. Id. at 618.
124. Id. at 617. Although the Court's recitation of economic theories of leverage and price
discrimination as objectives of tying arrangements seems indistinct, (cf. Bauer, Simplified Ap-
proach, supra note 70, at 292-96), it did indicate a belief that the joint sale of credit and homes
was likely to have as much of a procompetitive effect as an anticompetitive effect. While it
seems that this conclusion may be proper in this case, where Fortner had ample warning about
sufficient proof of economic power in the credit market, (see supra note 116), and failed to do a
comprehensive credit market analysis, (see Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 622 n.15), it is not altogether
clear that the additional proof requirement on antitrust plaintiffs is warranted. Tie-in arrange-
ments are per se illegal because, inter alia, they foreclose competition in the tied product mar-
ket. Therefore, and notwithstanding the Court's seeming rigidity on the necessity for sound
theoretical underpinnings for the plaintiff's contentions, the tying arrangement foreclosed sales
of homes to U.S. Steel's competitors and provided certain benefits to U.S. Steel having nothing
to do with the competitiveness of its product. Cf. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70,
at 297-305.
125. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 618.
126. Id.
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the market for the tied product. 1 7 At the very least, this seems to be a mat-
ter of defense to an established case of tying and is unusual in a per se
case.
128
Finally, the Court considered Fortner's main argument that the defen-
dants' credit terms were unique and that proof of uniqueness gave rise to a
presumption of economic power. Although the Court reiterated that unique-
ness can presumptively prove power, the Court also stated that the vendor
must have power to raise prices or impose burdensome terms which a seller
in a competitive market cannot impose."' Obviously, the Court's recitation
of these qualifications undercuts both the concept of an evidentiary pre-
sumption and its earlier cases creating such a presumption.130 The Court,
however, returned to a theme articulated in Fortner I, that a tying product's
uniqueness may stem either from legal recognition, as demonstrated by pat-
ents or copyrights, or from inherent or physical characteristics, such as land,
which cannot be shared by competitors.18 1 If, as in the case of credit, uni-
queness stems from economic considerations, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the tying product possesses some advantage unshared by competitors in
the market for the tying product.'8 ' According to the Court, Fortner failed
to demonstrate that Credit Corporation had unique financing capabilities or
"cost advantage over its competitors," and therefore the inexpensive credit
"proves nothing more than a willingness to provide cheap financing in order
to sell expensive houses.""'
127. See supra note 124.
128. See supra notes 123-24.
129. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620.
In this respect, Fortner II seems to retreat from the Court's opinions on economic power in
Northern Pacific Railway and Loew's, by suggesting that while some tying products may be
presumptively unique, as where physical or legal attributes confer power, other products may
be unique due to "economic" factors and each product must be evaluated sul generis. Id. at
621. In the case of credit, the Court seemed to suggest that it was not sul generis, a unique
commodity, and indeed, the favorable rates and terms in that case were not demonstrably
unique. Id. at 623. That does not mean, however, that interest rates and credit terms can never
be unique in an economic sense. They may be very distinct under some circumstances. Such
distinctiveness would stem from factors like regulatory controls and rules, supply of credit in
the relevant market, uncommitted reserves, and institutional loan policies. See Costner v. The
Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978); Note, Credit as a Tying Product, 69 COLUM.
L. RaV. 1435, 1445-53 (1969).
130. See Fortner H, 429 U.S. at 619 & n.12.
131. Id. at 620.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 622.
The Fortner II Court repeatedly returned to the plaintiff's failure of proof.
Quite clearly, if the evidence merely shows that credit terms are unique because the
seller is willing to accept a lesser profit-or to incur greater risks-than its competi-
tors, that kind of uniqueness will not give rise to any inference of economic power in
the credit market. Yet this is, in substance, all that the record in this case indicates.
Id. at 621-22.
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C. Market Power and Credit Insurance Tying
The Fortner litigation was helpful in reforming thought concerning the
use of credit as a tying device. From that litigation, a number of insights
concerning attempts to tie products to the sale of credit have been gained.
First, the Court established that credit may be a tying product and a credit
transaction may be a tying arrangement. 3 Second, a plaintiff claiming that
a credit institution has imposed a tie-in must articulate and demonstrate a
cogent theory concerning the economic utility of the defendant's tying con-
duct and the anticompetitive effect of the conduct." 5 Third, the defendant
must have economic power in the market for the tying product and that
power may be demonstrated by some power over price, some unique charac-
teristics not shared by its competitors, or by data suggesting that the defen-
dant has been able to impose the tie-in arrangement in a vast number of
situations. Fourth, even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defen-
dant has market power in the tying product, the plaintiff may be able to
demonstrate that the practice is unreasonable.'5 6
A tying arrangement linking the provision of credit insurance to the sale
of credit is, in most instances, distinguishable from the tying arrangement in
Fortner in several important respects. First, the plaintiff in Fortner was a
competent and self-sufficient businessman who took an active and aggressive
part in negotiations with Credit Corporation and the Homes Division over
the terms of the agreement. In many, if not most, credit insurance tying
situations, the transaction will involve debtors with modest or negligible ex-
pertise or experience with debt instruments, insurance terms, and little ac-
cess to advice on legal duties. Second, the Fortner tie-in was explicit; it was
set forth in the contract.1 3 7 In many credit transactions, the tie-in will be
Fortner attempted to demonstrate uniqueness in the credit market by showing that he
obtained 6% interest at a time in which the prime rate was 4.5%, that the loans were not
personally guaranteed by any officers of Fortner Enterprises, and that Credit Corporation pro-
vided 100% financing. See Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins, supra note 92, at 423-24. However, Fort-
ner failed to produce any evidence of credit terms offered U.S. Steel's competitors, and the
Court was unwilling to presume that the credit terms offered'by Credit Corporation were un-
available in the market and therefore "unique." Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 622 n.15.
134. A major point of contention within the Court was whether there were two separate
products being tied, or whether the transaction was a single product. Justice Black, in Fortner
I, distinguished usual credit sales in which the product and the financing were a single product
from the credit transactions in the case. 394 U.S. at 507. See also Dam, Fortner I, supra note
97, at 13-14 (discussing the dissenting opinion of Justice Fortas in Fortner 1). This seeming
distinction was never adequately resolved in either Fortner I or Fortner II. See Fortner II, 429
U.S. at 622-23 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
An arrangement tying credit with credit insurance is neither a "single product" nor an
"ordinary credit sale" because the credit is obtained to purchase some product; the credit in-
surance transaction is purely ancillary to the product financing arrangement.
135. See supra note 123.
136. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
137. See Dam, Fortner I, supra note 97, at 5-6.
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accomplished covertly (for example, where the lenders' officer includes
credit insurance without the debtor's knowledge) or verbally (for example,
where a loan officer insists upon or otherwise implies the need for credit
insurance notwithstanding disclosures required under Truth-in-Lending).
Third, U.S. Steel and its Homes Division were not primarily in the business
of providing credit; the provision of credit was merely an accommodation to
assist the sale of Home Division products. Conversely, in most consumer
credit ties, the insurance provider is primarily in the business of selling the
tying product, credit. Fourth, in Fortner the plaintiff did not, according to
the Court, have any cogent theory of the defendants' anticompetitive objec-
tive for imposing the tie. However, in most tying arrangements involving
consumer credit, the creditor desires to impose a tie for several pertinent
reasons, including the accomplishment of illegitimate objectives.8 s Finally,
the Fortner Court found that the alleged uniqueness of the credit tying
product was merely its inexpensiveness in relation to other sources of credit
in the area. Moreover, for many individuals the availability of credit, rather
than the relative price of credit, is the critical factor affecting the lender's
ability to impose additional terms or conditions on the credit transaction.'"
The preceding discussion suggests that credit insurance tying arrange-
ments may be subject to the Sherman Act and be held per se illegal. How-
ever, the Fortner litigation compels further attention to proof of economic
power in the market for credit, and to judicial application of the per se rule.
Several matters bear on the proof of economic power. First, the 1979 Hear-
ings demonstrate that lenders are able to obtain joint sales of credit and
credit insurance in a significant percentage of credit transactions and that it
is probable that a substantial number of these tie-ins are involuntary.4 "
Penetration rates of involuntary ties ranged between 45 percent to 95 per-
cent, and even the FRS Study pointed out significantly higher penetration
rates for some providers of credit, such as finance companies.14 1 This "host
of tying arrangements" is reminiscent of the Court's approach in Northern
Pacific Railway and Loew's, and presents some credible proof of economic
power in a credit insurance tying case where the defendant sells both credit
and credit insurance and has a significant number of joint sales.
138. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
The unavailability of the tying product from any vendor other than the defendant has been
recognized as a critical factor by other courts. For example, in Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp.,
660 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1981), the defendant, a fixed-base airport operator subleasing space to
the plaintiff, was found to have economic power over the tying product, the available space. Id.
at 1127-30. The court, distinguishing Fortner II, found economic power because there was an
absence of proof that anyone would have offered the plaintiff a leasehold on similar terms. Id.
at 1130. According to the court, the absence of other available space led to an inference that the
defendant had economic power in the tying product market. Id.
140. See supra notes 55-56, 60.
141. See supra notes 39, 41.
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It may be argued, however, that any lender, particularly in markets for
consumer credit, will be constrained by substantial competition in the credit
market and will be unable to maintain the tying policy over any appreciable
period of time because consumers will respond to coercive practices by going
to another creditor.1 4 ' Distinguishing the Northern Pacific Railway case, the
Court in Fortner II held that a supercompetitive price on the tied product
or the imposition of the tie-in in a significant number of transactions may be
proof of economic power in the tying product in the absence of some credi-
ble explanation by the defendant of the procompetitive attributes of the tie-
in. 1 3 With respect to credit insurance, it has been conceded that the pre-
mium rates for most forms of credit insurance are significantly higher than
comparable term life, disability and casualty insurance premiums, and that
pay-out ratios are below those for comparable forms of insurance. 14 4 This
fairly persistent history of relatively expensive premium rates of credit in-
surance, in light of the high penetration rates of joint sales of credit and
credit insurance, strongly suggests that vendors of credit and credit insur-
ance possess and exercise power in their respective markets to impose oner-
ous terms on debtors.
Moreover, it is not altogether clear whether the ability to provide both
credit and credit insurance necessarily accomplishes administrative or other
efficiencies, and is, therefore, a procompetitive attribute of the tying ar-
rangement.145 Rather, it appears more likely that the ability of lenders to
142. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 578-80 (Statement of Golembe Associates); see
also supra note 16.
143. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 618 n.10.
144. 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of John Heimann, Comptroller of the
Currency), 280-81 (statement of Robert Sable); Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 252; Rubin, Credit
Life Insurance and its Alternatives, 12 J. CONSUMER AiF. 145 (1978).
Although the figures vary somewhat, most credit insurance (and credit life, in particular) is
not a good deal for consumers. With pay-out ratios of approximately 25%-35% to price and
negligible administrative costs, prices on the insurance should be halved. 1979 Hearings, supra
note 3, at 288-91 (Statement of National Consumer Law Center). The difference, of course, is
reflected in profits and commissions. Id. On the issue of profits, it has been authoritatively
estimated that overcharges on credit insurance are somewhere in the neighborhood of $90 mil-
lion to $250 million. Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 243-54. See also, Mors, supra note 2, at 303-
08.
145. Compare 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 589-95 (Statement of Golembe Associates)
with 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 287-91. (Statement of National Consumer Law Center).
Although it seems apparent that joint sales reduce debtors' costs of searching for and com-
paring premium rates and terms for credit insurance, and that these costs are exacerbated by
the inherent complexity to consumers of credit and insurance transactions, there are several
factors suggesting that these are not reasons for high penetration rates on joint sales. First, the
Vaughan Report and the FTC Study reported significant numbers of debtors who misperceived
their purchase (or nonpurchase) of credit insurance. The prospect for high search costs was
virtually nonexistent for these consumers. Second, the administrative process associated with
applying an existing life or disability policy to a credit transaction is relatively simple and is
performed frequently.
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sell credit insurance enables them to stabilize earnings during periods of
credit supply fluctuation, particularly when supply is short and interest rate
limits prevent the achievement of market clearing rates. Similarly, reverse
competition and high premium rates present compelling reasons for creditor
imposed tie-ins. It also appears that the growth in affiliated insurance pro-
viders and captive insurers, as well as the merger trend among bank holding
companies and insurers, reflects the credit industry perception of the mini-
mum range of services necessary to enter or compete in a market.1"6 In other
words, there are no apparent and compelling justifications for compulsory
joint sales of credit and credit insurance, and the significant number of such
joint sales is more likely to be attributable to developments in industry
structure which increasingly require lenders to facilitate credit insurance
sales and to the profitability on credit insurance sales.
Lenders may also argue that there is a great diversity of credit provid-
ers in the United States and that debtors may freely go to another lender if
they find the tying conduct onerous. In other words, before the tying ar-
rangement can be actionable the debtor must demonstrate that the tying
lender had some unique characteristic.
There are, however, a number of factors complicating this argument.
First, the high penetration rates across the various types of credit providers
suggest that tying conduct is pervasive in markets for credit. In other words,
the fact that lenders are making a high number of sales of a relatively ex-
pensive product permits the conclusion that they have the economic power
to impose a tie-in. Second, there are costs of searching for alternative
sources of credit and information costs in understanding the terms of the
credit transaction, and these costs are especially significant where the debtor
does not have an ongoing credit relationship with the lender or where debt-
ors cannot discern the effect of terms.147 These costs may greatly limit con-
sumer mobility among credit providers.
Third, geographic and demographic factors limit the range of credit
providers available to consumers. For example, consumers in rural areas
often have far fewer potential lenders than consumers in urban areas.140
Similarly, low-income consumers of credit often have very few, if any, poten-
tial sources of credit, and may therefore be particularly vulnerable to credit
insurance tying practices. 1 " These factors strongly suggest the segmentation
The main arguments that joint sales of credit and credit insurance are beneficial concern
the cost effectiveness of "one-stop shopping" and some administrative efficiencies. However,
the achievement of cost efficiencies does not explain the coercive behavior evident in tying
arrangements because the cost savings will be passed along in a joint sale and willingly received
by the purchaser. Edwards, supra note 80, at 101. Nor does the alleged presence of such effi-
ciencies explain the relative expensiveness of most credit insurance.
146. Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins, supra note 92, at 434-42.
147. See supra note 145.
148. See Edwards, supra note 80, at 109-10.
149. Credit in Low-Income Areas: Hearings on S. 2146 & S. 2259 Before the Subcomm.
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of individual consumers, or discrete classes of customers, according to avail-
able creditors, and would accord those creditors some degree of economic
power with respect to imposing undesirable terms in the credit transaction.
Finally, recent merger cases have demonstrated that there is a definite
market segmentation among the various types of lenders and their debtors
and that the segmentation is due in large part to the offering of "unique
products and services to identifiable classes of customers."1 0 In concrete sit-
uations these factors can demonstrate economic power in a credit market,
irrespective of the presence of other credit providers.151
In an important sense, the Supreme Court's concerns in the Fortner
litigation are not significant with respect to credit insurance tying. In exam-
on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
86 (1974) (Statement of Hon. Hugh Scott) (1970) (Statement of Edward C. Sylvester,Jr.).
In the recent case Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist., 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted - U.S. - (1983), the court addressed the significance of precision in defining rele-
vant geographic markets in tying cases. The plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, claimed that the de-
fendant hospital excluded his access to the hospital facilities because of the hospital's exclusive
contract with one provider of anesthesia services and a requirement that all patients and physi-
cians use the one provider. Id. at 289. The hospital contended that it lacked power to impose
the alleged tie-in between operating rooms (tying product) and the one anesthesia service (tied
product) because of the presence of twenty other hospitals in the area. Id. The court disagreed,
concluding that about one-third of the patients in a discrete district, within which the hospital
was charged by law to provide services, used the hospital, and therefore, the more limited ser-
vice district was the appropriate geographic market. Id. at 291.
The reasoning in the Hyde decision suggests the importance of clear market definition in
tying cases. More importantly, it requires market definition on a practical and realistic basis.
In a credit insurance tie-in situation, geographic market definition may be delineated by com-
munities or neighborhoods and product market definition arranged by type of creditor. See
Note, Credit as a Tying Product, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1445-47 (1969).
150. United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
151. The two principal issues bearing on market power in tying cases seem to be the
prospects for market segmentation and the demand elasticity for the tying product. Considera-
tion of market segmentation forces attention to a realistic assessment of consumer opportuni-
ties for better terms and, reciprocally, the degree of market foreclosure. The demand elasticity
for the tying product permits conclusions concerning the receptiveness of the market to monop-
oly conditions and the ability of purchasers to avoid a seller's behavior. See Edwards, supra
note 80; Costner v. The Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) (in a Section 106 case,
market power demonstrated by plaintiff's inability to get credit elsewhere and market com-
prised of only two banks).
As previously discussed, the various markets for credit may be segmented, as a matter of
proof, according to buying patterns, sales strategies, geographic limitations and regulatory con-
straints. Similarly, there may be a range of demand elasticities along credit purchasers, based
principally along income lines. Ohio Study, supra note 6, at 116-18. Generally, demand for
credit is relatively inelastic and becomes more inelastic as consumers become less able to obtain
credit. Id. at 118-21. Thus, a high degree of market segmentation (viz. narrow relevant market
definitions) and an inelastic demand for credit should permit a conclusion that a lender with a
not insubstantial market share in the relevant markets has economic power, and would provide
a plausible explanation for coercive behavior (i.e., extension of power into another market). See
Edwards, supra note 80, at 107-08.
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ining the defendant's economic power in the credit market, the Court in
Fortner II was attempting to find compatibility between a recognized theory
of tying and the defendant's conduct. According to the Court, therefore,
since Fortner was unable to marshal evidence demonstrating some economic
leveraging or price discrimination, it became probable that the tying ar-
rangement had procompetitive origins and effects. 1
In the case of credit insurance tying, where the victim is not likely to be
an aggressive businessperson, the need for judicial consideration of the coer-
cive effect of tying arrangements becomes greater. As previously discussed,
the Supreme Court has condemned tying arrangements for their tendency to
force buyers to forego the exercise of free choice among competing prod-
ucts.153 Moreover, the changing structure in the market for credit insurance,
and the likelihood of competitive disadvantage to lenders who do not offer
credit insurance or who do not exhibit high rates of joint sales, suggests the
strong possibility of competitive foreclosure, not on the basis of merit, but
rather on a willingness to practice coercive behavior. In light of the coercive
and foreclosure effects occasioned by prevalent credit tying arrangements,
particularly with respect to consumer credit, it may be necessary for the
courts to develop appropriate standards to accommodate the issue of eco-
nomic power in the credit market, paying careful attention to the opportuni-
ties for meaningful choice among credit providers.
The Fortner litigation is the Court's most recent consideration of tying
arrangements as antitrust concerns and there was no indication of a judicial
retreat from per se analysis in tie-in cases. Credit insurance tie-ins provide
another useful opportunity to reconsider application of the per se rule and
the most principled conclusion is that coercive or involuntary tie-ins should
be illegal per se. There are no discernably overwhelming attributes or justifi-
cations for credit insurance tie-ins-whether accomplished explicitly or im-
plicitly-only some indistinct possibilities of lost savings for consumers.'"
Bank-holding companies were unable to produce any compelling proof of
efficiency justifications in the 1979 Hearings, and other lenders would proba-
152. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 617-19.
153. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 6.
Bauer persuasively argued that coercion of buyers should alone be sufficient injury to war-
rant per se condemnation of tying arrangements because purchasers have an interest in free-
dom of choice. Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 300-03.
154. Nor should the credit or credit insurance industries be entitled to special treatment
under the antitrust laws, absent a strong legislative policy otherwise. In Hyde v. Jefferson Par-
ish Hosp. Dist., 686 F.2d 286, 292-94 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1983), the
court rejected strong arguments from the hospital that the per se rule should not be applied to
the health care industry. The court's decision was consistent with the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion to a similar argument in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 102 S.Ct. 2466 (1982).
In considering justifications for tying arrangements and policy reasons for exclusion from the
per se rule, the credit insurance industry is certainly not entitled to treatment different than
the health care industry.
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bly have less ability to show justification. More important, credit insurance
tie-ins are considered illegal by federal banking authorities and many state
insurance regulators.
Further, judicial consideration of procompetitive benefits and compari-
sons with anticompetitive effects on a case-by-case basis would be costly and
unlikely to save many insurance tie-in practices. A bright-line rule is more
likely to stifle the coercive conduct than a more flexible standard and may
therefore provide more clarity to lenders selling credit insurance. Of course,
the 1979 Hearings suggest that state and federal bright-line prohibitions on
credit insurance tying have not been extremely effective. However, the de-
terrent effect of treble damage awards and the prospect of class action law-
suits may move antitrust enforcement to the forefront in efforts to control
credit insurance tying.15 5
D. Coercion
A recurrent issue in many tying arrangement cases concerns the exis-
tence or degree of coercion effected by the seller to accomplish the tie-in.
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly required proof of coercion
in a tying case, it has suggested the need for proof that the tie-in was not
voluntary.'" In the context of credit insurance tying arrangements, the
question of buyer coercion presents some challenging problems of proof be-
cause credit insurance tying is often implicit and is often accomplished by
subtle threats or veiled promises of continued credit.
In the absence of an express or explicit provision in the agreement, the
plaintiff must generally make some showing that there was a tying arrange-
ment rather than a purely volitional joint sale of two products or the mere
purchase of a single product.15 7 In other words, proof of coercive behavior
155. Craswell makes an important point that courts applying antitrust norms are institu-
tionally incapable of adequately dealing with the wide range of complex issues involved in tying
arrangements. Creswell, Tying in Competitive Markets; supra note 80, at 697-700. The author
may, however, be unduly optimistic about the procompetitive aspects of credit insurance tying
(even assuming, as he does, that it occurs in competitive markets) and unduly pessimistic about
judicial ability to sort complex facts and theories. More important, the author may misperceive
both the effect of and potential for consumer protection litigation as a tool for improved per-
formance. The antitrust requirements that the defendant impose the tie-in and have some de-
monstrable market power permit the fact-finder to ensure that an involuntary tie-in has oc-
curred and that competitive conditions in a market may be impaired. The prospect for treble
damage awards in private antitrust actions should provide both deterrence against ongoing vio-
lations and incentives for private actions. In most respects, consumer protection legislation and
regulatory mechanisms do not provide substantial deterrence or private incentives. Therefore,
if involuntary tying is a pervasive problem (which the 1979 Hearings indicati is the case), then
perhaps a more deterrence-oriented action, like antitrust causes of action, may be the more
appropriate and successful policy.
156. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 6. See also, Blair & Finci,
supra note 66, at 557.
157. See Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d at 1130-32; Bogus v. Am. Speech and
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by the seller, or involuntary behavior by the purchaser, may be necessary to
show that there was, in fact, a tying arrangement. Since proof of coercion is
a factual issue, there have been difficulties in consumer class action lawsuits
involving tying arrangements in which theplaintiffs must demonstrate com-
mon questions of law and fact." In most circumstances, however, there is
no special requirement that the antitrust plaintiff make a particularized
showing of coercion; rather, the plaintiff must merely allege and prove that
the seller sold two distinct products and that the purchase of the tied prod-
uct was involuntary or unwaanted.
The courts have provided various methods of determining the extent to
which an implicit tie-in is coercive, including course of conduct and dealing
by the seller, " ' threats or misrepresentation of facts by the seller, ' " or "the
seller's success" in imposing the burdensome terms on significantly large
numbers of buyers."' For example, proof of economic power in the market
for the tying product may also present sufficient proof that the defendant
coerced the joint purchase of the tying and tied products.1' Finally, proof
by the purchaser that there existed a reasonable fear of economic reprisal by
the seller if the purchaser refused to purchase the tied product in accompa-
niment to purchases of the tying product may be sufficient proof of coercive-
ness by the seller. 113
These considerations may be applied to credit insurance tying arrange-
ments. As discussed, the high penetration rates of credit insurance in credit
transactions may demonstrate both economic power in the credit market
and a lender's policy imposing tie-ins. Thus, a high degree of joint sales by
a creditor may be probative evidence of coercive behavior, even in the ab-
Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d at 287; Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 978
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
158. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1216 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). See also Blair & Finci, supra note 66, at 557-61; Bauer,
Simplified Approach, supra note 70, at 313-14; Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual
Coercion Doctrine, 30 VmD. L. Rzv. 755 (1977).
159. See, e.g., Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d at 1131-32.
160. See, e.g., Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
161. See, e.g., Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1977).
See also, Blair & Finci, supra note 66, at 561-62.
162. See, e.g., Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1353 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Schweitzer
& Halbrook, supra note 19, at 753-54.
163. See, e.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 288 (3d Cir.
1978); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978).
These cases suggest an important perspective on the coercion doctrine. Coercion is largely
a matter of proof that the seller imposed a tie-in and that coerciveness (or, reciprocally, invol-
untariness) may be viewed subjectively and from the purchaser's perception. Thus, if purchas-
ers can demonstrate an implicit or explicit threat of a refusal to deal or termination by the
buyer, then that should be sufficient to maintain an antitrust action. See Blair & Finci, supra
note 66, at 564-66.
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sence of direct proof of explicit coercion. Second, fairly high rates of con-
sumer deception concerning the inclusion of credit insurance in the transac-
tion present clear cases of coercion for tying purposes. Whenever a lender,
routinely or on an individual basis, subscribes the debtor to a credit insur-
ance policy without the debtor's knowledge or affirmance, a coercive tie-in
has occurred.' 6 Finally, in a class action context, where debtors can demon-
strate a reasonable basis for a belief that they feared they would be denied
credit, or that their line of credit would be terminated if they refused credit
insurance, there may be sufficient proof of coercion by the seller, especially
where the defendant has imposed the tie-in on substantial numbers of pur-
chasers or where the debtor has strong incentives to impose the tie-in.'"
There are no substantial reasons, in law or policy, for refusing to permit
an antitrust action where the purchaser alleges, and can subsequently
demonstrate, that a vendor conditioned the sale of one product on the
purchase of another product by implicit coercion, subtle or explicit threats
of refusals to deal further, or other similar manifestations. Obviously, these
manifestations may not be enough proof in a case where the plaintiff is in-
credible, the vendor lacks market power, or there is only one product for
sale. The trier-of-fact is most often the best judge of these matters, and a
limitation on actions for implicit threats or involuntary purchases obscures
important objectives for antitrust law. In class action lawsuits, on the other
hand, procedural requirements, and not substantive antitrust requirements,
may necessitate a much clearer and more specific articulation of individual-
ized coercion by vendors.
V. IMMUNITY AND EXEMPTION
There are two relevant sources of immunity from the antitrust laws
which may operate in credit insurance tying situations. They are, first, the
164. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 3, at 288-89 (Statement of National Consumer Law
Center).
This sort of conduct violates the federal Truth-in-Lending laws which require accurate
disclosure of the consumer's right to refuse credit insurance or obtain it through any vendor
selected by the consumer. 12 C.F.R. 226 (1981). The conduct would also violate section 106 of
the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970. See 12 C.F.R. 225.4(c) (1981).
165. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1977).
For example, the FRS Study reported that approximately 34% of consumers surveyed
stated that credit insurance was either "recommended" or "strongly recommended." In consid-
ering an individual case or class action involving such a tie-in, the court should consider the
relative position of the parties, the defendant's percentage of credit transactions in which credit
insurance is sold and the existence of other purchaser complaints of coercive behavior, the in-
terest rate, credit terms and marketing policies of the creditor and the independent desirability
of the credit insurance to the purchaser. See generally Bauer, Simplified Approach, supra note
70, at 311; Blair & Finci, supra note 66, at 561-65. Consideration of these factors will suggest
the plausibility of a tying strategy by the seller and the probability that joint sales by the
defendant were involuntary or coercive.
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statutory limitation on the antitrust laws imposed by the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act; and, second, the more general limitation of the state action doc-
trine. The effect of these exemptive enclaves may be to shield involuntary
tying arrangements from federal antitrust actions. The two exemptions, al-
though sharing their roots in notions of federalism, 1" stem from different
sources and the consequences of their application are sufficiently different to
justify individual development in the following sections.
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the "Business of Insurance"
In 1944, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,167 which held that the busi-
ness of insurance is not exempt from the reach of the federal antitrust laws.
Prior to that time, it was generally assumed that since the business of insur-
ance, which consisted in large measure of insurance contracts between insur-
ers and policyholders, was conducted pursuant to state contract laws and
was not in commerce or subject to the interstate commerce powers of the
federal government.'" In that case, however, the Court held that insurance
contracts may have an effect on interstate commerce and therefore would be
subject to the federal commerce powers including the antimonopoly restric-
tions in the Sherman Act.1 "
Immediately after South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, and in response
to the criticisms of the decision, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.1 70 The compromises reached in promulgating the Act, and indeed the
166. See Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Ex-
emptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. REv. 265, 291-
92 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan & Wiley]; Note, The Definition of: "Business of Insur-
ance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug, 1980 COLUM. L. Rv. 1475, 1481-
83 [hereinafter cited as "Business of Insurance"].
167. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
168. See Carlson, The Insurance Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 57 TxAs L. Rv.
1127, 1128-30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Carlson, Insurance Exemption].
The Supreme Court, in the early case of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), held
that an insurance policy transaction was not in interstate commerce. Thereafter, the Court
frequently reiterated its basic premise in Paul v. Virginia that the process of insurance con-
tracting was an essentially intrastate activity and therefore imperious to federal statutory regu-
lation. Carlson, Insurance Exception, supra note 168 at 1129 & n.16.
169. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
170. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in relevant part
Sec. 2(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance Provided, that ... the Sherman Act, and. . . the Clayton Act,
and.., the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.
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array of undercurrents at work in Congress at that time, reflect dual con-
cerns of federalism or state prerogative over perceived local activities, and
the institutional concerns engendered by federal courts applying difficult
standards of antitrust liability to insurance transactions.'7 1 The bill reflects
these concerns by conditioning the immunity from the antitrust laws only
where the activity in question is essentially an insurance transaction; that is,
the "business of insurance," is regulated by the state authorities and is not a
boycott or other act of coercion or intimidation. 72
All of these considerations are implicated in tying arrangements be-
tween credit and credit insurance. In the first place, are credit insurance
tying arrangements the "business of insurance" as that statutory term has
been construed by Supreme Court decisions? If so, then they may be im-
mune from the Sherman Act. Second, is the practice of credit insurance ty-
ing "regulated by State Law" and therefore immune from the antitrust
laws? Third, is the protective shield of the McCarran-Ferguson Act lost
where a credit insurance tie-in is accompanied by acts characterized as "co-
ercion" and "intimidation"?
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have articulated standards for
determining the existence of the "business of insurance. 1 7 3 In Union Labor
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,74 the Court summarized the criteria for ascer-
taining whether a particular practice is the "business of insurance": "[f]irst,
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policy-
holder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.' '1 6 The Su-
preme Court did not, however, indicate the relative significance of these cri-
teria, and instead evaluated all three to determine whether the practice con-
stituted the business of insurance. 17
In the specific context of tying arrangements involving credit insurance
and credit transactions, it is relatively clear that such tie-ins are not the
Sec. 3...
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable
to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation.
59 Stat. 33-34, as amended, 61 Stat. 448 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-13 (1976)).
171. See Carlson, Insurance Exception, supra note 168, at 1128-37; Note, "Business of
Insurance," supra note 166, at 1481-83.
172. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166 at 274. These elements form the analytic ap-
proach commonly used by courts in deciding antitrust issues in an insurance industry context.
See, e.g., Anglin v. Blue Shield of Va., 693 F.2d 315, 316 (4th Cir. 1982); Proctor v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 312-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
173. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982); Group Life & Health
Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
174. 102 S.Ct. at 3002.
175. Id. at 3009.
176. Id. Cf. Sullivan v. Wiley, supra note 166, at 282-84 & n.77.
[Vol. 32
HeinOnline  -- 32 Drake L. Rev. 904 1982-1983
Antitrust and Credit Insurance
business of insurance. In a recent action by the Federal Trade Commission
seeking to enforce a civil investigative demand for evidence of possible in-
voluntary tying practices by finance companies, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the sale of credit insurance is "purely ancillary to the
insurance relationship" and therefore not the "business of insurance.'
The court in FTC v. Dixie Finance Co., Inc. drew a critical distinction be-
tween "the actual sale [of insurance] and the fact that the sale is a precondi-
tion to the extension of credit .... ,,"7 The court concluded that the rela-
tionship which the Commission was seeking to investigate was not the
relationship between an insurer and insured and did not directly implicate
177. FTC v. Dixie Finance Co. Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,160 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Federal Trade Commission has undertaken an extensive review of credit insurance
practices by finance companies and has initiated its investigation by the issuance of civil inves-
tigative demands seeking information on tying behavior. See Audubon Life Insurance Co. v.
FTC 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,911 (D. La. 1982); FTC v. Manufacturers Hanover Con-
sumer Services, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T1 64,903 (E.D. Pa. 1982). One court has avoided
the McCarran-Ferguson immunity issue, at least preliminarily, while addressing the question of
the enforceability of the investigative demands. General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366
(7th Cir. 1983).
The Fifth Circuit's per curiam opinion in Dixie Finance Co., concluding that tying of con-
sumer credit loans and credit insurance was not the business of insurance because the insur-
ance transaction is ancillary to the credit transaction, was based upon a line of Fifth Circuit
cases in which the Truth in Lending Act was applied to credit tying arrangements. See Cochran
v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979); Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468
(5th Cir. 1979); Cody v. Community Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1979). Those cases
concerned premium financing of insurance policies which was insufficiently disclosed, and the
Fifth Circuit held that the financing activity was "ancillary to the insurance relationship be-
tween the insurance company and the policyholder" and therefore not the "business of insur-
ance." Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d at 470. Furthermore, the court's holding
under the McCarran Act that the premium financing arrangements were not the business of
insurance was buttressed by analogy to antitrust cases construing section 2(a) of the McCarran
Act. See Note, McCarran-Ferguson Act Immunity from the Truth in Lending Act and Title
VII, 48 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 730, 740-42 (1981).
178. 1982-83 Trade Cas. at 1 71,499-76.
The court recognized that offering insurance policies in a credit transaction may occasion
the sale of insurance policies, but held that the marketing characteristics of the transaction
were not alone enough to conclude it was the business of insurance. Id.
The Dixie Finance Co. court did not, however, directly address the issue of whether the
tie-in practice has the effect of spreading the policyholders risk. See supra note 175 and accom-
panying text. Credit insurance has an obvious and intended effect on the allocation of risk, but
the risk that is being shifted is within the credit transaction and not within the insurance
transaction. In other words tying arrangements shift the risk of loss in the credit transaction,
both in terms of magnitude and frequency, to the insurance transaction by assuring the per-
formance of the obligation to repay. The effect of the practice would substantially reduce risk
in the credit transaction, but would have no effect on risk in the insurance transaction. While
this practice may be shrewd for integrated firms providing both insurance and credit, it does
not satisfy judicial standards for the "business of insurance." In Group Life & Health Insur-
ance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 212 (1979), the Court stressed that the "business of
insurance" consists of the spreading or underwriting of risk in an insurance relationship, not its
reduction by transactions outside the insurance relationship.
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any insurance relationship between the borrower, the lender and the
insurer.1 7
9
The decision in FTC v. Dixie Finance Co., Inc. appears correct. Al-
though the practice of effecting ties between the loan transaction and the
sale of credit insurance has the effect of reducing risk on the financing
transaction, the tying arrangement does not directly concern the insurance
relationship between the insurer and policyholder. Moreover, credit insur-
ance tying arrangements often include the involvement of finance compa-
nies, credit unions and other lenders outside the insurance industry. In-
deed, the 1979 Hearings addressed issues raised by increasing non-banking
activities by federally regulated banks and bank holding companies, includ-
ing sales of insurance. Although the credit insurance firms providing insur-
ance are frequently subsidiaries of, or otherwise affiliated with the lenders,
the involvement of non-insurance companies in the entire transaction would
negate the conclusion that the transaction was purely an insurance one.180
In other respects it also appears that involuntary tying arrangements in
the lending markets would fall outside the immunity of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act. Immunity from antitrust liability under Section 2(a) requires
that the practice be "regulated by state law." This term has received varied
interpretations by the courts, some requiring a general and broad regulation
of the insurance industry by the state"1 and others demanding a specific
and particularized legislative provision authorizing the practice."s' The for-
mer line of cases permits exemption where the state legislation merely pro-
hibits unfair methods competition or provides general guidelines for regula-
tion of the insurance company.183 The latter cases, which look for indicia of
179. 1982-83 Trade Cas., at 71,499-77.
It was the presence of such triparte relationships--involving insurers, policyholders and
non-insurance third parties-that sealed the Court's decisions in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno and Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co. that the challenged conduct was
not the "business of insurance."
180. FTC v. Dixie Fin. Co., Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65.160 (5th Cir. 1983).
181. See Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assoc. v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701
F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983); Anglin v. Blue Shield of Va., 693 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975).
182. See United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4685 (June 8, 1983); Owens v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1981) (Slovier, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assoc. v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau,
701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983); Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 527 F.2d 233 (1975).
For the most part, these opinions do not rely on thorough examinations of the McCarran
Act's legislative history or on any evolutionary concept of the Act's scope. See, e.g., Dexter v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 527 F.2d at 236; Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). Rather, the courts have
reasoned that the Act was intended to create an environment in which state laws could displace
federal antitrust laws and that the exercise of the state powers should be accorded wide lati-
tude and discretion. See Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 527 F.2d at 236-37. Ac-
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state authorization for the specific conduct being challenged and active state
regulation, are analytically sounder and more faithful to both the probable
legislative intention of the McCarran Act and the evolutionary and progres-
sive nature of the Sherman Act.'" A reading of the "regulated by state law"
cording to these courts, the scope of state regulation should be liberally construed to exempt
from antitrust liability those acts by insurance companies in which the state may have ex-
pressed an interest. See Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 503 F.2d at 729.
184. See United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 426, 453 & n.85 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4685 (1983).
The court in Crocker Nat'l Corp. reviewed the legislative history of the McCarran Act and
found an intention to immunize insurance actions that were regulated by the state, not merely
legislated for or generally covered by state statutes. 656 F.2d at 453-54 & n.88. See also Carl-
son, Insurance Exemption, supra note 168, at 1157. Moreover, the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), has been construed to
hold that affirmative regulation by the state, not mere legislation, albeit comprehensive, in the
field of insurance activity is necessary to find immunity under the McCarran Act. See Owens v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 654 F.2d 218, 246 (3d Cir. 1981) (Sloiter, J., dissenting). See also,
Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at 288-89.
The distinction between standards is most apparent in the Ninth Circuit. In Crocker Nat'l
Corp., the court held that interlocking directorates between insurance companies and banks
were not specifically regulated under state law, and, notwithstanding general state regulation of
interlocking directorates and specific regulation of interlocking directorates between other
types of firms, held that the McCarran Act was inapplicable. 656 F.2d at 452-53. The court's
reasoning was comprehensive and thoughtful. According to the court, the absence of specific
regulation of the challenged conduct, against a background of general state legislation and su-
pervision, warranted application of section 8 of the Clayton Act, especially since its application
would not impair any state policy. Id. at 453. The purpose, language and history of the McCar-
ran Act, the court held, clearly showed that immunity should be granted only where there
exists a direct and substantial conflict between federal antitrust norms and state regulated ac-
tivity. Id. at 454 & n.89.
Subsequently, in Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assoc. v. Klamath Medical Services Bu-
reau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1287 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983), which involved a claim that the defendant tied a
basic prepaid health care contract to a prescription drug benefit plan, the court attempted to
confine the rationale of Crocker National Corp. to a "general [statutory] scheme of regulation
governing insurers' corporate interlocks with banks." The court added that in Crocker National
Corp. "we distinguished cases where, as here, a general system of regulation might imply an
affirmative decision to allow the behavior not specifically prohibited." Id. at 1287 n.10, (citing
United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d at 453 n.88). In Klamath-Lake however, the
specific conduct complained of was the alleged tying of one form of insurance coverage to an-
other form of insurance coverage, but the court pointed to general regulatory statutes permit-
ting state regulation of health care service contractors and forbidding unfair or deceptive acts
or practices by insurers, and to specific statutes prohibiting tie-ins between insurance and the
sale of property, real estate or services. Id. at 1287. Incredibily, the court also claimed that the
practices in question were regulated by state law because of state antitrust laws which would
reach the practices to the extent that they were not subject to state insurance laws. Id.
Decisions like Crocker National Corp., which predicate immunity on specific state ap-
proval of certain insurance conduct and active state regulation of the conduct, are better for-
mulations of policy. The paramount federal policy expressed in the Sherman Act was intended
to be superceded only by clear and specific statements of state law and policy, not by a pano-
rama of general state insurance laws. Moreover, the absence of state supervision over the chal-
lenged practice warrants the conclusion that the state insurance policy is insufficiently compel-
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requirement in Section 2(b) indicates that to condition immunity upon a
showing of close state supervision and an affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy in favor of the challenged activity would effectively incorporate the state
action doctrine into the McCarran Act. This accommodation of immunity
norms under the Act and the state action doctrine may be premised on the
identical concerns of federalism underlying both, and would present a more
consistent and developed body of law to review questions of immunity.'85 An
application of state action doctrine to credit tying arrangements is presented
in the next section.
Finally, to the extent that a credit insurance tying arrangement involves
involuntary or coercive behavior by the lender, the tying conduct may be
outside the protection of Section 2(a) of the Act because it involves an "act
of boycott, coercion, or intimidation" prohibited by Section 3 of the Act.
Although early cases construed this provision as applying only to "boycotts"
or "blacklisting" of insurance agents by insurers,' the Supreme Court re-
cently held that the provision was capable of broader application. In St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,'8 7 a case involving an alleged
conspiracy among three medical malpractice insurers to refuse to sell mal-
practice insurance to physicians previously insured by another insurer, the
Court strongly endorsed the lower court's finding that Section 3 applies to
relationships between insurers and policyholders, not just to relations be-
ling to justify its supremacy over federal antitrust goals. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166,
at 288-90; Carlson, Insurance Exemption, supra note 168, at 1157.
185. The seminal case on the state action doctrine, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
was decided two years before the Congress promulgated the McCarran Act. It is therefore prob-
able that the Congress was aware of the Court's view of the authority to the Sherman Act to
reach state regulated activity. But see Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at 271-72. Further-
more, the legislative debate on the McCarran Act indicates that the proponents of the act envi-
sioned a federal statutory regime which would exempt insurance activity which was actively
regulated by the state, and only when the antitrust laws' application would "invalidate, impair,
or supercede" state law. Carlson, Insurance Exemption, supra note 168, at 1155-59. See also
supra note 184. It is therefore arguable that the phrase "regulated by state law" was intended
to develop and progress as the state action doctrine (or, more precisely, the underlying notions
of federalism and comity between federal and state sovereignties) ripened by judicial review.
This reading of section 2(b) and the state action doctrine in pari materia would not only
provide a consistent and predictable framework for analyzing issues of immunity, but would
also substantially accomplish one recommendation articulated by the National Commission for
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. The Commission, which was highly critical of
the McCarran Act's broad immunity, recommended that the state action doctrine serve as the
principal screen for insurance immunity. Hanson, The Interplay of the Regimes of Antitrust,
Competition and State Insurance Regulation on the Business of Insurance, 28 DRAKE L. Pzv.
767, 775-76 & n.33 (1978-79) (citing National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures, Report to the President and the Attorney General, 225 (1979)).
186. See Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974);
Meicler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g 372 F. Supp. 509
(S.D. Tex. 1974).
187. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
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tween insurance companies and their agents, and that the term "boycott" in
that section should be given a natural and evolutionary definition.88
The Court in St. Paul carefully reviewed the history and the structure
of the McCarran Act in concluding that Congress intended that the Sher-
man Act apply whenever coercive conduct is employed to erect barriers be-
tween customers and target competitors and to foreclose competition in any
market.18' The Court was clearly suggesting that the definitional terms in
Section 3(b) were capable of growth as commercial practices required and
were to be applied to guard against the competitive evils flowing from coer-
cive conduct. Tying arrangements inherently involve coercive behavior in-
tended to foreclose access to alternative sources of supply, and the Court's
analysis of the "boycott" provision in Section 3(b) strongly warrants inclu-
sion of conventional tying arrangements in the proscribed category of acts of
"coercion, or intimidation."" 0
The analytic principles of the McCarran Act are relatively direct, al-
though their application is often difficult. The antitrust laws are intended to
apply except in the narrow circumstance of conduct constituting the "busi-
ness of insurance" and "regulated by state law." Immunity from the anti-
trust laws is to be narrowly construed to carry out legislative intent. ' Con-
188. Id. at 550-53.
The Court in St. Paul demonstrated the progressive development of the term and cause of
action for "boycott" activity. Id. Moreover, the Court stated that the Congress intended that
the terms in section 3 be given progressive construction. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at
278-79.
189. 438 U.S. at 553.
190. Cases holding that tying arrangements involving insurance were not boycotts or acts
of coercion or intimidation were premised on the contention that section 3(b) did not apply to
acts between insurers and policyholders and were decided before the St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. case. See, e.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.
1974); Mcllhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
One of the few cases to examine the argument that acts of coercion or intimidation in-
cludes tying arrangements failed to centrally address the issue. Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical
Assoc. v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1983). In considering
the issue of McCarran Act immunity for an alleged tying arrangement between a prepaid health
care contract and a prescription drug plan, that court characterized the plaintiff's argument
that the defendant's policy "induced policyholders to boycott the local pharmacies by the 'ef-
fective economic compulsion' derived from its pharmacy benefits." Id. at 1288. This argument,
and the court's conclusion that the defendants "offered to the public an attractive package" in
which the plaintiff was entitled to participate, does not consider the more plausible contention
that tying arrangements are acts of coercion and intimidation as those terms were intended to
be construed by the Congress. Id.; Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at 278-79 & n.59; contra
Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458, 462 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d
571 (3d Cir. 1978); Carlson, Insurance Exemption, supra note 168, at 1169 & n.244. A tying
arrangement is an exclusionary practice which is often manifested in a foreclosure of a competi-
tor's access to markets. Where a tie-in is accomplished by coercive methods, it should not enjoy
immunity from the antitrust laws in actions by foreclosed competitors or by consumers unless
the arrangement is essential to the accomplishment of some state policy or objective.
191. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. 3002, 3007 (1982).
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gress intended that the Sherman Act apply to coercive and boycotting
conduct by insurers even if it is regulated by the state and is the business of
insurance. Like the commerce clause and the interstate commerce require-
ment in the Sherman Act, the proscriptive and exemptive provisions of the
McCarran Act are intended to grow and evolve as commercial practices de-
velop."' Applying those principles to credit insurance tying arrangements, it
seems apparent that the conduct, narrowly construed, is not the business of
insurance and is inherently coercive conduct outside the protection of the
McCarran Act. Therefore, unless the tying arrangements are exempt under
the state action doctrine, there is no immunity for insurance-providing lend-
ers imposing the tie-ins.
B. The State Action Doctrine
In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, the Court carefully
tailored its opinion around the issue of state regulation over the insurance
companies' actions, finding that the state of Rhode Island did not authorize
the conduct in question. 193 The Court's care underscores the importance of
particularized consideration of state policy and regulation by a federal court
applying antitrust norms.
The state action doctrine is premised on judically articulated concerns
of federalism.'" The doctrine exempts from the reach of the Sherman Act
private conduct which exerts an anticompetitive effect but which is under-
taken pursuant to some clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy and which is actively supervised by the state.195
In the context of antitrust cases involving insurance related activities,
the McCarran Act exemption has subsumed most of the litigation and there
is very little case law on the issue of state action immunity. To the extent
that the state action doctrine has been implicated in insurance cases, how-
192. See supra notes 185, 188. The concept of the Sherman Act as an evolutionary and
progressive charter of economic freedoms and policies is not new, either with respect to the
Act's substantive reach or its procedural aspects. In McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orle-
ans, 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980), the Court explored the evolutionary relationship between the
Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. In United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), the Court described the Sherman Act as a
"Magna Charta of free enterprise" and discussed its importance in nurturing "fundamental
personal freedoms."
These cases do not decide the issue of the reach of the McCarran Act to tying arrange-
ments, but they do strongly support the notion that the Sherman Act is the principal source for
national competition policy, that the Sherman Act is, and should be, viewed as a progressive
and evolutionary document. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at 290.
193. 438 U.S. at 553-54 & n.27.
194. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 166, at 291-92; Hanson, The Interplay of the Re-
gimes of Antitrust, Competition and State Insurance Regulation on the Business of Insur-
ance, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 767, 835 (1978-79).
195. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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ever, the courts have permitted immunity only where an insurer claiming
immunity can demonstrate a compelling and clear state policy being ad-
vanced by the allegedly anticompetitive conduct and active supervision by
the state."'
In a more limited situation of tying arrangements, it seems very doubt-
ful that the state action doctrine would exempt them from the antitrust
laws. Where the state has very general statutes governing marketing prac-
tices by insurers, by permitting debtors to exercise a choice of insurer yet
requiring credit insurance on the loan transaction, for example,'" the courts
should consider the state policy relatively "neutral" and not sufficiently af-
firmative or directive to fall within the state action doctrine. Only legisla-
tion which specifically and affirmatively directs involuntary tie-ins should
protect private conduct imposing the tie-ins. On the other hand, where the
state law expressly prohibits tie-in arrangements, the state action immunity
would be inapplicable because the practice contravenes, and does not ad-
vance, state policy. 0 8
To satisfy the second requirement of the state action doctrine, that the
state actively supervise and regulate the challenged conduct, an insurer
must demonstrate that a state regulatory commission or agency approved
contracts, policies or lender practices requiring the purchase of credit insur-
ance with the sale of credit and scrutinized application of the contracts to
debtors. It is unlikely that any state agency charged with supervision and
enforcement of the state insurance laws would condone a practice such as
coercive tying arrangements, but specific and active regulatory oversight
may exempt the tie-ins from the antitrust laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Joint sales of credit and credit insurance are a pervasive factor in mar-
kets for credit and it appears that a substantial number of these joint sales
are accomplished by coercive and involuntary marketing techniques and
practices. A government study reported that about sixty-two percent of all
credit transactions in the United States are accompanied by a joined sale of
credit insurance. The study concluded, however, that involuntary tying
196. See, e.g., United States v. Title Insurance Rating Bureau, 700 F.2d 1247, 1252-53
(9th Cir. 1983); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., 542 F. Supp. 782, 786-92 (D. Mass. 1982).
197. See supra note 31.
In the context of tying arrangement cases, the state action doctrine could have limited
application in a couple of circumstances. First, the doctrine may immunize conduct which is
characterized as a boycott or act of coercion or intimidation and, second, it could operate to
exempt conduct which is not the "business of insurance." See Carlson, Insurance Exemption,
supra note 168, at 1140.
198. Carlson, Insurance Exemption, supra 168, at 1146-47.
The state action doctrine is applicable to conduct compelled by the state decision-maker
and does not exempt anticompetitive conduct which contravenes state law or regulation. Sound
Inc. v. AT&T, 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980).
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practices are not a significant problem in American lending markets, partic-
ularly the banking industry. Critics of the study argued that it vastly under-
stated the pervasiveness of credit insurance tying, which could be as high as
ninty percent of credit transactions. Moreover, even the government study
strongly indicated that involuntary tying of credit insurance is very preva-
lent in unregulated markets for credit from some financial institutions.
Against this controversial background of the credit insurance industry,
legal doctrines concerning the illegality of tying arrangements were ex-
amined to discern the applicability of those doctrines to credit insurance
tying arrangements. A lender's economic power in the market for the tying
product, an essential element in an antitrust action under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, may be demonstrated in several pertinent ways. High pene-
tration rates, relatively high premium rates for credit insurance, significant
markets segmentation, and an inelastic demand among some classes of cus-
tomers, like the poor, may show significant market power by the lender. The
exercise of economic power by a lender in forcing joint sales of credit insur-
ance and loans should be actionable as an illegal tying arrangement. Such
practices limit consumers' range of choice in credit and insurance transac-
tions, impairs competitive opportunities by other lenders and insurers, and
may alter the structure of the credit and insurance industries. In fact, there
is evidence of an increase in concentration in some industries where credit
insurance tying is prevalent.
Actions under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for illegal tying arrange-
ments are well suited to prevent these marketing practices and foster com-
petitive behavior and market structures. Indeed, antitrust actions may pro-
vide a needed ancillary enhancement to the consumer protection laws and
government regulation under banking and insurance laws. A consideration
of the degree of coerciveness of tie-ins is useful in antitrust litigation to
prove that tying has occurred and to demonstrate the lender's intent to
force a tie-in. Attempts to make antitrust actions more difficult by limiting
actions only for explicit tying will impair competition policy and the deter-
rence objectives of private antitrust litigation.
Finally, the Article considered the immunities and exemptions from an-
titrust litigation for insurance tie-ins under the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
the state action doctrine. It appears that a conventional tying arrangement
between a loan and credit insurance does not enjoy immunity under either
source. It is clearly not the "business of insurance" and it is not authorized
or compelled by state law.
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